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 Abstract 
Considering the current debate over which strategies are most effective in promoting environmental 
and human welfare in protected areas, we focus on Integrated Conservation and Development 
Programs, an approach which seeks to find ‘win-win’ outcomes by supporting environmentally 
sustainable and profitable income generating sources. Counter, the predominant literature, we 
measure program effectiveness in terms of human welfare, accounted for by relative changes in 
household income and asset growth. Specifically, we seek to determine the additionality of 
Integrated Conservation and Development Programs in protected areas over the short run. Using a 
case study, additionality was determined by comparing two proximate reserves in the Brazilian Bolsa 
Floresta Programme that received the programme to varying degrees. An impact evaluation 
approach using parametric and non-parametric techniques was used, demonstrating key findings of 
no significant change in income and a large (65%) and significant effect on asset growth due to 
treatment under one matching approach. This dual result may be explained by the narrative where 
households reinvest program gains in productive assets. However, this narrative may overstate 
willingness to invest gains considering low levels of household education and risk aversion. 
Moreover, results in terms of asset growth are likely biased and overstated due to unobservable 
variable bias and remaining imbalance in key observables- particularly the amount of time 
participating in the direct cash transfer component of the Bolsa Floresta Programme.  Evaluation at a 
later date when the program has had full potential to be implemented and adopted by households is 
recommended. 
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 Introduction  
1.1 Problem Background 
Poverty remains an important global problem where 1 in 5 people live on less than $1.25 per day, 
and many households (HH) live without access to electricity, drinkable water, sanitary conditions, 
and sufficient food (Shah, 2013). Furthermore, environmental degradation and climate change have 
remained at the forefront of policy debate as global emissions and pollutants push ‘planetary 
boundaries’ (Rockström et al., 2009). Tackling these issues has mobilized resources on all scales 
ranging from international agreements such as the Millennium Development Goals and forthcoming 
Sustainable Development Goals to national, regional and local policies and initiatives.  
In an attempt to mitigate climate change, international actors have seen opportunities to 
compensate for emissions through trading carbon offsets in international programs such as Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+). These programs hold a global 
perspective as emissions and offsets may occur in spatially separate locations.   
International donors have pledged significant finances for forest based climate change mitigation; 
however there is no clear strategy which is  the most effective method to manage protected areas 
and improve the welfare of inhabitants (Nolte et al., 2013). One reason for the strategy debate can 
be attributed to differences in accessibility which promote both ease of enforcement, but also 
greater environmental threat (Ferraro & Hanauer, 2014). Moreover, pressure for land is driven by 
demand for production of food, fuel, extractive resources and local population’s need to support 
their own livelihoods (Butler & Laurance, 2008; Nolte et al., 2013). 
There is a body of literature surrounding strategies which promote environmental service provision. 
Approaches range from prohibiting land use, to incentivising positive outcomes through direct 
payment, to promoting alternative environmentally sustainable economic activities. Moreover, 
outcomes are not only a function of incentives and regulations; they are affected monitoring, 
enforcement and implementation of sanctions (Wunder et al., 2008). Furthermore, in many cases, 
due to political and logistical barriers, sanctions are not administered, creating opportunities for 
nonconformity (ibid). Although, the causal linkage between poverty alleviation and achieving 
environmental goals is debated as outcomes are dependent on external factors such as national 
policies and long term funding (Sunderland et al., 2012); what is clear is that human livelihood 
strategies are spatially linked in rural environments. This particularly relevant in ‘biodiversity 
hotspots’ such as the Amazon (Naughton-Treves et al., 2005). 
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 Although many environmental service project designs account for local inhabitant wellbeing, there is 
debate over whether environmental and development objectives are complementary or conflicting 
(Sunderland et al., 2012). On one hand, gains in income may promote more sustainable use of the 
environment and investments in clean technology and education. On the other, income gains may 
lead to increased resource demand and act as a driver of further deforestation (Naughton-Treves et 
al., 2005). This was graphically illustrated by an example where HH use program resources to 
purchase chainsaws (ibid). Evidently income shocks have the potential to affect HH decisions which 
in turn affect environmental outcomes. Gaining a more clear understanding of specific conservation 
strategies and how they interact with human wellbeing is relevant.  
In the context of protected areas, there is a body of literature on the effectiveness of different 
management strategies (Honey-Roses et al., 2011; Nelson & Chomitz, 2011; Nolte et al., 2013).  
However, this literature is solely focused in terms of initiative’s primary environmental goals (Andam 
et al., 2010; Sims, 2010). This thesis fits within this literature gap, and focuses on changes in human 
wellbeing due to environmental conservation strategies in protected areas. Furthermore, it follows 
an impact evaluation framework, which accounts for additionality of change. Additionality refers to 
the degree the program has contributed to achieving its desired goal relative to the base-case or 
unobserved counterfactual scenario where the program was not implemented (Persson & Alpízar, 
2013). A case study approach will be followed which is useful in program evaluation as there is 
heterogeneity in environmental, socio- economic and political factors that affect program 
implementation and outcomes. However, as Börner et al. note, the contextual nature of case- study 
based program evaluation results in low external validity and extrapolation of results into broader 
conclusions (2013).    
This thesis has focus on the effectiveness of one management strategy called Integrated 
Conservation and Development Programs (ICDP), in the context of protected areas. This approach 
seeks to use the synergies between poverty and environmental degradation to simultaneously tackle 
these issues (McShane et al., 2011). The strategy promotes alternative and sustainable livelihood 
practices, which both increase environmental awareness as well provide greater return for 
participants. Thus, a ‘win-win’ situation is developed (Wunder, 2013). The ICDP narrative follows the 
logic that cash inflows to communities offer HH a reliable source of income with which to invest and 
cope with shocks  to their environment (Arnold et al., 2011). In some cases this investment has been 
found to “improve [poverty indicators and] household well-being through impacts on health, 
purchasing power, household productivity and resource allocation, asset consolidation, and reduce 
inequality” (Sills et al., 2014, p 65).  
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 The ICDP approach is intuitive as environmental preservation and human use are often not spatially 
mutually exclusive. They are linked  in rural environments which despite conservation status often 
allows for human occupation (Naughton-Treves et al., 2005). However, although the ICDP intuition is 
appealing, its track record has been questionable (Hughes & Flintan, 2001; García-Amado et al., 
2013; Bauch et al., 2014). ICDP have been criticised for providing small incentives, short time 
horizon, bad targeting, low reliability and conflicting goals (Winkler, 2007; Blom et al., 2010; 
Sunderland et al., 2012; García-Amado et al., 2013). Perhaps a more realistic view of the ICDP ‘win-
win’ rhetoric is acknowledging the trade-offs between livelihood and conservation activities, and 
“looking for synergies between competing land use” (Sunderland et al., 2012, p 237). 
1.2 Research Question   
Based on this debate, this thesis seeks to answer the following research question: What is the 
additionality of community level ICDP programs in protected areas in terms of short run1 changes to 
HH welfare measured by income and assets.  
One can hypothesis that there are strong barriers to actual accrual of these benefits over the short 
run, even when HH gain access to program support and expected new income generating sources 
have high returns. One barrier is the low flexibility of HH to commit their own resources over the 
short run. Another is that HH may be risk averse which is a function of knowledge and familiarity 
with practices, as well as preferences and resource constraints. Thus, perhaps it is optimistic to 
expect significant changes to HH welfare over a short time horizon, regardless of anticipated rates of 
return. These barriers are mitigated with training, education and time where local users can 
determine the viability of altering their resource allocation in light of their own constraints. In this 
light one can expect to witness a greater program effect or additionality over a longer time horizon. 
This thesis contributes to the small body of quasi- experimental literature which uses micro- level 
quantitative evaluation techniques to determine the effectiveness of specific programmes 
implemented in protected areas (Weber et al., 2011; Miteva et al., 2012; Börner et al., 2013). It 
answers the call for quantitative impact evaluation based on observed, reaI- world programs and 
policies (Ferraro et al., 2011) which leads to better informed policy decisions (Persson & Alpízar, 
2013). Conducting program evaluation on projects which target human and environmental well-
being have implications on achieving these goals in their own right and influence future project 
development strategies, donor confidence and funding allocation (Smith, 2000; Börner et al., 2013; 
1 The neoclassic definition of short run incorporates the idea that certain factors of production (often capital) are held 
constant. Firms or in this case HH, are unable to reallocate all factors to optimize profit due to restrictions in the form of 
prior investment, or contractual agreement with suppliers. Thus the short run is characterised by a lack of complete 
flexibility resource allocation (Perloff, 2008).  
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 Davies et al., 2014). Gaining a better understanding of the causal linkages between program designs 
and outcomes will help mitigate the structural misalignment of project goals and incentives between 
donors, implementers and evaluators (Ferraro, 2004; Salafsky, 2011).  
1.3 Thesis structure 
This thesis is structured into 9 chapters. The next section will provide a brief literature review and 
background to the Bolsa Floresta Programme (BFP) and the study area. Section 3 will discuss the 
theoretical framework which focuses upon the causal pathway of the ICDP on income and asset 
growth. Section 4 is the empirical approach which highlights the issue of selection bias in 
observational studies and ways of mitigating it. A discussion of standard parametric and non-
parametric approaches and a list of general observable factors which we seek to control for will be 
given. Section 5 introduces the data used in this thesis and focus upon the specific control variables 
that allow us to capture the causal pathway discussed in section 3. In section 6 our results are 
provided. This section selects the best model based on bias reduction. Furthermore, program 
additionality is measured through the program treatment effect. Section 7 discusses the robustness 
of results based on remaining covariate imbalance as well as issues of unobservable bias. Section 8 is 
the discussion which highlights findings in relation to our conceptual model and potential issues with 
this narrative. In addition, limitations with the study will be discussed. The paper concludes with 
final thoughts, policy recommendations and opportunities for future research.     
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 Background  
2.1 Literature  
The rigorous impact evaluation literature of program effectiveness in protected areas is largely 
measured in terms of environmental outcomes; however there are a few studies which measure 
protected area effectiveness in terms of poverty indicators (Andam et al., 2010; Sims, 2010). These 
have found some evidence in contrary to the hypothesis that living in protected areas inhibits 
development and exacerbates local poverty. Rather, results demonstrate that protected areas can 
contribute to economic development and reduce poverty (ibid). However, these studies are 
criticised as they provide no recommendation of how and which method of investment in 
environmental and human wellbeing is best in achieving these goals within these areas (Bauch et al., 
2014). 
The literature focusing on the specific ICDP strategy within protected areas which using rigorous 
impact evaluation techniques is very small. One reason for this is the structural misalignment 
between funders, implementers and donors, making data availability problematic (Davies et al., 
2014). The two most relevant sources will be briefly summarized, as they relate directly to this thesis 
in terms of general location, quasi experimental methodology and focus on human wellbeing. Firstly, 
Weber et al.’s case study (2011) uses cross sectional data from 2006 to explore the effectiveness of 
an ICDP implemented in the Brazilian Amazonian state of Pará. Weber et al. (2011) model the HH 
labour allocation decision between income generating sources where the decision is affected by 
forgone wage endowment in land, HH labour supply and ability of members.  Weber et al. (2011) use 
a combination of matching and regression analysis over a variety of dependent variables including 
assets, total income and cash with and without income generated from forest activities to check for 
robustness. Results demonstrate that participation increases cash and asset accumulation. 
Furthermore, there is some evidence that the ICDP promotes income diversification as the program 
adds an additional income generating source which HH use as insurance against shocks (Weber et 
al., 2011). 
Secondly, Bauch et al. (2014) use a panel data set (1997-2006) on the same case study as Weber et 
al. to explore the effectiveness of an ICDP. The authors use a combination of quasi experimental 
evaluation techniques including difference in differences (DID) and matching. DID is applied in order 
to control for unobservable time- invariant factors, while matching on baseline pre-program 
indicators allows comparison ‘like with like’ (Bauch et al., 2014).  Their analysis uses several different 
definitions of treatment, considering both community level and HH levels and implemented over 
different points in time. These definitions account for both direct and indirect improvements in 
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 welfare which can accrue to HH through the ICDP. Furthermore, these definitions capture 
differences in participation as a result of program targeting versus participant volunteering. In terms 
of the welfare dependent variable, key findings include positive point estimate impacts on HH 
income, but no change in HH assets (Bauch et al., 2014).  Using similar techniques, this thesis seeks 
to determine the impact of ICDP within protected areas. It contributes to the literature by adding a 
rigorous case study with unique socio- economic and environmental conditions. Broadening the 
literature base improves the understanding of the effectiveness of specific strategies over the short 
run.  
2.2 The Bolsa Floresta Programme 
In order to answer the research question, a case study of the BFP will be used. A brief background to 
the context of the program will be given. The BFP is an incentive based programme implemented in 
the state of Amazonia, Brazil as a means to protect environmental resources and improve rural 
livelihoods in the region. The program has been operated by the NGO Fundação Amazonas 
Sustentável (FAS) since its inception in 2007 and seeks to build capacity of local communities and 
reserves (Sills et al., 2014). As of 2013, the BFP benefits over 7,000 families and 35,000 people in 15 
state owned protected areas (refer to Figure 1) (FAS, 2013). These reserves have many communities 
of permanent residents, which must adhere to conditions relating to activities and management. The 
BFP is set to continue until 2050 (Sills et al., 2014).  
Figure 1: Reserves participating in BFP, Amazonia, Brazil 
 
Source: Elias Cisneros, ZEF, University of Bonn 
BFP Components 
The BFP has four primary incentive components which operate on different scales. They are 
interrelated in their goals, however differ in approach.  
a) Bolsa Floresta Renda (Income component)    (Community level)  
b) Bolsa Floresta Social (Social Component)   (Reserve level)  
c) Bolsa Floresta Associação (Association Component)  (Reserve level) 
d) Bolsa Floresta Familiar (Family Component)   (HH level)  
 
6 
 
 Furthermore, these incentive- components are not uniform in their implementation across reserves, 
communities and HH.  Implementation is decided by FAS who choose how and when to implement 
them. Furthermore, actual participation on a HH level could be affected by conscious (motivation, or 
sentiments that the program constrains livelihood decisions) or unconscious (lack of information or 
awareness) motives. The four BFP components simultaneously affect local welfare and behaviour 
which in turn affects their physical environment. A brief discussion of each component and on how it 
acts as an inventive strategy will now be provided.  
 
a) Bolsa Floresta Renda (Income component):   
Under the Bolsa Floresta (BF) Income component, reserves receive R$140,000 (USD 84,916) annually 
which is distributed on a community level (Sills et al., 2014). The funds are used for investment in 
environmentally sustainable income generating activities that “target on-farm processing activities 
for value added of existing products and non-timber forest product value chains, or alternative 
income sources such as eco-tourism, aquaculture, small-livestock breeding, and native honey 
production” (Börner et al., 2013, p 13). These activities must align with the reserve’s management 
plan and aims to diversify livelihoods (Agustsson et al., 2014). BF Income reduces barriers to entry 
and costs of switching practices as the investment reduces infrastructure and capital costs, and 
provides education supporting the alternative income source (Newton et al., 2012). As BF Income 
seeks to alter HH behaviour in a way that promotes both alternative income generation and 
environmental outcomes it can be considered as ICDP. 2 
 
b) Bolsa Floresta Social (Social Component)    
This component operates at the reserve level with an amount of R$140,000 (USD 84,916) per 
reserve per year (Sills et al., 2014). In conjunction with public sector institutions, it targets 
infrastructure improvements in transportation as well as education, sanitation and health services 
(Börner et al., 2013). 
 
c) Bolsa Floresta Associação (Association Component)   
This component is also applied at the reserve level and corresponds to 10% of the Family allowance 
(see Family component) (Sills et al., 2014). This component aims to strengthen local organization and 
participation (Agustsson et al., 2014) and benefit reserve inhabitants (Börner et al., 2013).   
 
2 The terms ICDP, treatment and BF Income will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis  
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 The BF Social and BF Association components are unique as they are implemented on the reserve 
level. They are difficult to categorize as they do not affect environmental outcomes directly. 
Furthermore, they also do not directly promote alternative livelihood structures. In reality they act 
as grease to improve the functioning of local society, and provide opportunities for human, physical 
and social capital development.  
d) Bolsa Floresta Familiar (Family Component)     
The Bolsa Floresta Familiar (BFF) component is applied on the HH level, consisting of a monthly 
payment of R$50 (USD 30) conditional on agreement for adopting ‘good forest management 
practices’, which are additional to the basic conditions required to live in the reserve (Sills et al., 
2014). Since this payment is insufficient to live off, it acts as an incentive for compliance. BFF 
requires having been a resident in the reserve for 2 years (Börner et al., 2013).  
 
BFF can be considered as a strategy known as Payment for Environmental Services (PES). A brief 
discussion of PES and how it relates to HH welfare will be provided. PES relies on positive incentives 
or payments which are conditional on performance or service delivery. Although HH- gains may be 
relatively small, this income source may be quite effective in cash constrained areas (Wunder et al., 
2008). Moreover, PES provides other less tangible positive effects such as improving property right 
security by recognizing tenure of service providers (ibid). Furthermore, it appears that “incentives 
may contribute to asset building for land user’s by improving access to education and capacity 
building, encouraging cooperation within communities and promoting infrastructure development” 
(Lima, 2014, p 54). Lastly, gaining program access acts to provide a sustained flow of services to 
those in need (Landell-Mills et al., 2002). However, these outcomes cannot be considered the norm. 
There has been debate over whether and under what conditions PES is effective at improving 
livelihoods (Persson & Alpízar, 2013; Lima, 2014). 
 
Furthermore, PES has been criticised over promotion of inequitable outcomes as PES targets  groups 
that are not the poorest strata of society given they land owners (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Agustsson 
et al., 2014). Furthermore, PES may alter land value which may lead to appropriation (Grieg-Gran et 
al., 2005). These  issues of inequality have given rise to the idea of coupling PES with side objectives 
in terms of “poverty alleviation, regional development, employment creation” (Wunder et al., 2008, 
p 849), which also improves political feasibility (ibid). Although these goals are worthwhile, explicit 
targeting may undermine the ability of PES programs to deliver on their primary goal of 
environmental service provision. Furthermore, as Wunder at al. (2008)note, targeting the poor is not 
a necessary condition for them to benefit. Lastly, although it could be argued that voluntary 
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 participation covers HH opportunity cost, PES may reduce income generating options which are 
important to HH sense of satisfaction in their daily activities. In this sense, PES can be thought of as 
pushing land owners to become ‘conservation stewards’ (Newton et al., 2012), when in fact they 
seek allies.  
Thus, there are several approaches simultaneously being implemented under the umbrella of the 
BFP. This multi- strategy approach is reasonable given the complicated nature of program design and 
how HH decision’s and external forces unfold. Approaches are combined in order to gain from 
component design and follow a holistic approach in tackling desired goals of poverty alleviation and 
environmental service provision. 
2.3 Study Area  
This thesis will focus on 2 reserves of the 15 reserves where the BFP has been implemented. These 
reserves are called Rio Negro Sustainable Development Reserve (Reserve de Desenvolvimento 
Sustentável (RDS)) and Rio Negro Environmental Protected Area (Area de Proteção Ambiental (APA)) 
which are located in the ‘deep amazon’ (Viana, 2008).  The Rio Negro RDS is located on the South 
bank of the Rio Negro river is 1,031 ha in size and has 19 communities and 525 HH (Luiza et al., 
2013). The Rio Negro RDS was founded in 2008, and the BFP was implemented in 2009 (Luiza et al., 
2013). On the other hand, the Rio Negro APA is located on the North bank of the Rio Negro, is 586 
ha in size, has 16 communities and 1,300 HH (FAS, 2013). The two reserves are highly proximate to 
one another and equivalently 70 km northwest from the nearest city Manaus. Although the distance 
between the two reserves appears small, opportunities for trade are low due to the size of the river 
and difficulties in crossing due to land bars (refer to Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Study Area 
 
Source: Elias Cisneros, ZEF, University of Bonn 
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 The difference between the reserves names APA and RDS reflects differences in reserve structure in 
terms of management and conditions for living within its borders. However, it can be argued that 
the two structures are similar as both have human inhabitants that are allowed to sustainably use 
reserve resources. Furthermore the lack of real management plan as implemented by the state of 
Amazonas (and administered by the Secretary of Environment and Sustainable Development) in 
either reserve adds to the validity of making comparisons between them. 
One key difference remains between the APA and RDS which pertains to the degree the BFP was 
implemented at the time of survey (depicted in Figure 3). By 2013, the time of survey, the southern 
RDS reserve had received all four aforementioned program aspects of the BFP, while the northern 
APA had not received the BF Income component. This allows us to use APA as a counterfactual for 
the treated RDS. It should be noted that BF Income was not implemented immediately and 
uniformly across all communities in the treated reserve. Rather, starting in 2009 communities began 
to implement BF Income.  
Figure 3: Program Timeline 
 
Source: Own Depiction 
*The majority of survey questions pertain to previous year (2012), except for asset value which was also included 
recollection values for 2007.  
 
The BFP Narrative of Conservation  
One of the primary goals of the BFP is to target environmental service provision and improve 
environmental outcomes, specifically through reducing deforestation. Although not strictly in line 
with our narrative, a brief theoretical background of the BFP approach to achieving gains in these 
outcomes will be provided.  
The BFP seeks to reduce internally driven deforestation through the BFF PES component. Although 
BFF has extra conditions on HH activities relative to the standard reserve inhabitant agreement, as 
Börner et al. (2013) note, these conditions are not significantly different, and rather act as a means 
of gaining local public support for the program and the values that it holds. This is important when 
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 considering the long term approach held by the program. Rather, deforestation from external 
sources is seen as a more important threat. This is tackled by the program’s ICDP and PES 
components which seek to gain local inhabitants as stakeholders in environmental conservation. It 
seeks to create local ‘conservation allies’ and promote stewardship built upon both intrinsic and 
extrinsic motives as a means to counter highly lucrative deforestation by those living outside the 
community (García-Amado et al., 2013). 
Measuring environmental outcomes are out of the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, one could 
argue that analysing this long term goal over short time horizons is inappropriate. Moreover, 
measurement is subject to strategic bias by HH to underreport changes in environmental outcomes. 
Lastly, we experience data restrictions in measuring these outcomes. For these reasons 
environmental outcomes will not be further discussed. The theoretical framework will focus on HH 
welfare as measured by the dependent variables of income and asset growth and how they are 
affected by the BF Income treatment.  
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 Theoretical Framework 
In the context of the BFP case study, my research question and hypothesis will be reiterated. We 
seek to determine the additionality over the short run of the BF Income component measured by a 
change to HH income and asset growth. Additionality of treatment is measured relative to the 
counterfactual where BF Income treatment was received in the RDS reserve, while APA had not at 
the time of survey. Furthermore, the short run signifies the period between 2009- 2013 over which 
treatment was implemented. The remainder of this section will discussion the causal pathways of 
how BF Income affects income and asset growth. These pathways can be categorized into four main 
component, change in labour allocation, change in demand, social capital development and 
economies of scale in production. A depiction of these pathways is portrayed in Figure 4. 
a) Changes in Labour Allocation 
The first way that BF Income affects HH income is through changes in labour allocation between 
income generating sources. This is an explicit goal of the BF income component, as participants 
move toward sustainable income generating sources. However there is nuance with regard to this 
factor for several reasons. Firstly, under the presumption that the BF Income source is more 
profitable per hour of labour3, participant’s labour allocation may be reduced as income required to 
support HH needs is satiated. This can be considered as an income affect. On the other hand, the 
opposite scenario may occur whereby higher per hour wage results in substitution for leisure hours 
in favour of labour. According to the literature, larger HH have the ability to offer more labour, and 
thus are more likely to participate to some degree (Weber et al., 2011). Thus, it is unclear the 
direction which BF Income affects HH income. The overall effect of higher per hour wage in terms of 
change in labour allocation is determined by the relative magnitude of the income effect and 
substitution effects for each HH.  
 
b) Changes in Demand 
A further income and substitution effect can occur through changes to demand for goods and 
services. In terms of the income effect, HH may choose to spend additional income (holding labour 
allocation constant) on consumption goods such as durables that have a positive effect on future 
income. For example, investment in productivity changing technology such as access to electricity, 
purchases of equipment etc. may have positive feedback into income generating activities. On the 
other hand, due to the ICDP prices of goods may vary. For example, as more HH within a community 
3 This presumption is reasonable as BF Income has externally invested resources that should improve productivity. 
Furthermore, HH would not switch income generating practices if it were not more perceived  to be more profitable than 
their current income generating activity. 
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 produce chicken, the price of chicken may fall resulting in a reduction of HH spending ceteris 
paribus.  
 
c) Social Capital Development 
Social capital is important to consider and has positive effect on income for several reasons. Firstly, it 
affects opportunities which arise in the community. Furthermore, due to better communication, it 
reduces asymmetric information, which lowers transaction costs and improves markets for goods, 
credit, land and labour (Narayan & Pritchett, 1999). Moreover, social capital leads to adoption of 
informal insurance between community members, mitigating HH risk aversion and the probability to 
invest in and diffusion of productivity enhancing technology (ibid). In addition, it creates greater 
interest in investing in goods with positive externalities (ibid). Lastly, social capital helps determine 
which HH continue participating after program support has ended (Bauch et al., 2014). Thus, social 
capital affects our dependent variables in many ways through their production and consumption 
decisions, and their ability to sell and purchase goods and services. In terms of this case study, BF 
Income affects social cohesion due to community involvement in the decision making process and 
implementation of the chosen ICDP. In addition, considering the entire community has access to the 
ICDP, one would expect knowledge sharing and communication of effective practices and 
modifications to occur between members. 
 
d) Economies of Scale in Production 
When many community members participate in the income generating activity, economies of scale 
can affect HH income by reducing costs.4 Economies of scale can reduce cost through resource 
pooling which may lower the marginal cost of inputs and transportation of goods. In addition, 
resource pooling amongst participants allow for the opportunity to invest further resources (in 
addition to the ICDP investment) in technology and physical capital which positively affect 
productivity.  Moreover, through labour specialization, efficiency in the production process may be 
improved. Thus, economies of scale generated by BF Income provide HH with opportunities to 
combine labour and financial resources as a means to reduce cost and achieve gains in productivity, 
both of which positively affect income. 
 
  
4 As will be explained in the section 5, income is calculated net costs. 
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Figure 4: Pathways that BF Income Affect Dependant Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own Depiction 
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 Empirical Approach 
One measure of additionality is determining the program, or treatment effect relative to the base 
case scenario or counterfactual, where the counterfactual can be defined as the “beneficiary’s 
outcome in the absence of the intervention” (Khandker et al., 2010, p 43). This section will discuss 
how the treatment effect can be measured. However, there is an inherent problem in actually 
observing a counterfactual as participants can only be in one state of being: either treated or 
untreated. To overcome this constraint, experimental design and statistical techniques are used to 
develop a valid counterfactual. 
4.1 Treatment Effect 
There are two relevant parameters which are used as measures of program effectiveness which 
include the Average Treatment Effect (ATE), and the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT).  
The ATE reflects the expected gains from treatment from a randomly chosen individual of the 
population (Khandker et al., 2010). The ATT is a narrower measure as it compares average difference 
in treated and untreated individuals conditional on being in the treated area (ibid) .  
ATE 
Returning to our first measure of program effectiveness, the ATE is defined as the difference in 
expected outcome between treated and control group, which includes binary treatment status (D= 1 
or 0), and outcomes Y(0),Y(1).  
𝜏𝜏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(1)|𝐷𝐷 = 1] −  𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(0)|𝐷𝐷 = 0] (1) 
ATT 
Due to uneven covariate balance between the treatment and control groups, the ATT is commonly 
measured (Sekhon, 2008). Equation (2) states that the ATT is the difference in mean outcome for the 
treated group if they were treated [𝑌𝑌(1)|𝐷𝐷 = 1] and if they were not [𝑌𝑌(0)|𝐷𝐷 = 1] (Caliendo & 
Kopeinig, 2008). The true treatment effect is measured in (2), however since the second term (the 
counterfactual) is unobservable (note the observable terms are highlighted in red); an observable 
proxy must be incorporated. Furthermore, although it is appealing to simply replace the second term 
of (2) with the untreated sample 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(0)|𝐷𝐷 = 0], this is not valid when groups were not randomized.  
 𝜏𝜏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(1)|𝐷𝐷 = 1] −  𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(0)|𝐷𝐷 = 1] (2) 
Therefore, we add and subtract  𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(0)|𝐷𝐷 = 0] from the right hand side, creating (3), and then re- 
arrange, putting the different observed states of nature on the left side, creating (4). The two 
remaining terms on the right hand side depict selection bias. If the difference between these two 
terms is zero, as portrayed in (5), selection bias is not a problem and we can accurately measure the 
treatment effect (𝜏𝜏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴). Selection bias can be thought of as the difference between this true 
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 counterfactual (left hand side of (5)), and the observable one that we use as its proxy (right hand 
side of (5)).  
 𝜏𝜏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(1)|𝐷𝐷 = 1] −  𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(0)|𝐷𝐷 = 1] + 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(0)|𝐷𝐷 = 0] −  𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(0)|𝐷𝐷 = 0] 
 
(3) 
 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(1)|𝐷𝐷 = 1] −  𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(0)|𝐷𝐷 = 0] =   𝜏𝜏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(0)|𝐷𝐷 = 1] −  𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(0)|𝐷𝐷 = 0] 
 
(4) 
 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(0)|𝐷𝐷 = 1] =  𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(0)|𝐷𝐷 = 0] 
 
(5) 
4.2 Selection Bias 
Now that the effects of selection bias on treatment effect estimation have been depicted, it is 
necessary to understand how it occurs and why it is an issue. In particular, selection bias occurs 
when certain characteristics affect both an individual’s likelihood to participate and realized 
outcomes (Heinrich et al., 2010). This issue can be illustrated with a common example of positive 
selection bias. If individuals with higher levels of education choose to receive job training treatment, 
their wage outcomes will likely be higher than the untreated group not only because they received 
the additional job training, but because they have higher education (used as a proxy for productivity) 
as well. This issue can be based on both observed characteristics, or unobserved characteristics 
(such as motivation which may cause self- selection) which are found in the error term (Khandker et 
al., 2010). Selection bias is key issue which causes estimates of program effect to be biased and 
impact to be miss-estimated (Heinrich et al., 2010). 
Randomization 
One technique to solve for selection bias and isolate for the treatment effect is through a 
randomized experimental approach. This is the gold standard method in accounting for selection 
bias and accounts for both observable and unobservable in order to determine causality (Shadish et 
al., 2008). Under a randomized approach, pre- program, participants are randomly selected for 
treatment and control groups. Thus, one can say that on average there are no observable or 
unobservable differences between these two groups (Smith, 2000). With a sufficient sample size, all 
individual’s characteristics will be balanced between the two groups and the difference in outcomes 
can be attributed only to the effect of the treatment or program. Formally, this can be written as: 
{𝑌𝑌(0),  𝑌𝑌(1) ⊥ 𝐷𝐷}, which is interpreted as outcomes Y(0) and Y(1) are independent of treatment 
status (D) (Andam et al., 2010). To further explain our process; under randomization we do not need 
to control for any attributes as on average both observable and unobservable ones are equal 
between the two groups (Khandker et al., 2010). Thus the treatment effect can be directly 
estimated. 
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 Figure 5: Depiction of Selection Bias: 
 
Source: own depiction 
Remark: note the direction of arrows, where feedback between treatment and outcome with 1) do not occur 
- 1a includes all relevant factors which affect treatment and outcome.  Thus under unconfoundedness 1b) is 
irrelevant by assumption. Controlling for 1a) on 3) allows estimation of the parameter of interest the ATT 
4.3 Unconfoundedness/ Conditional Independence 
However, random assignment is not the norm, whereby a commonly used approach is to ‘replicate’ 
randomization. This imitation relies on the unconfoundedness or conditional independence 
assumption which is developed by economic theory and applied to both parametric and non-
parametric methods (Khandker et al., 2010). This assumption posits that only observable 
characteristics are relevant in determining treatment status and potential outcomes are 
independent of treatment status (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). Therefore, by assumption, 
unobservable ones are insignificant sources of bias (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Another way to 
think about it is that before the program was implemented, or if the program had not occurred, 
measures of welfare should be equal conditional on observable covariates. Mathematically, 
unconfoundedness can be expressed as follows {𝑌𝑌(0),  𝑌𝑌(1) ⊥ 𝐷𝐷|𝑋𝑋,  ∀ X}, where Y(0),Y(1) are 
outcomes, D is treatment status, and X are observable control covariates (Khandker et al., 2010). 
Referring to Figure 5, when controlling for observable characteristics (1a on 3), the treatment effect 
(2 on 3) can be estimated. After controlling for covariates X, treatment assignment is as good as 
random which mitigates selection bias. Under conditional independence, equation 5) can now be re-
written as 6) holding the same interpretation as before, except outcomes are also conditional on 
observable covariates X.  
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(1)|𝑋𝑋,𝐷𝐷 = 1] −  𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(0)|𝑋𝑋,𝐷𝐷 = 0] =   𝜏𝜏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(0)|𝑋𝑋,𝐷𝐷 = 1] −  𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(0)|𝑋𝑋,𝐷𝐷 = 0] (6) 
 
However, it should be noted that if one is unable to achieve complete pseudo 
randomization, selection bias may remain. Furthermore, due to the unobservable term in 
our selection bias equation, measuring selection bias remains difficult, although one can 
hypothesis the direction of bias.  
 
   
3. Outcome 
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 4.4 OLS 
This subsection will briefly discuss the use of the commonly used parametric Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) design in the context of selection bias. OLS has similar assumptions of unconfoundedness and 
selection on observable characteristics, making it a useful benchmark in ATT estimation. To estimate 
ATT with OLS we run a regression on outcome variables conditioning on observable covariates X and 
treatment status D. The OLS regression can be defined as follows: 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽 + (𝜏𝜏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, where 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  is the dependent variable,  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 are the set of control covariates with corresponding 𝛽𝛽 coefficents. 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 is the treatment dummy with coefficient 𝜏𝜏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  is the error term which contains all 
unobserved characteristics that effect outcome. The error term may also contain unobservable 
characteristics which are related to both treatment and outcome. Thus, cov(D, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖) ≠ 0, which creates 
unobservable bias in our 𝜏𝜏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 estimate (Khandker et al., 2010). This is not an issue for a well- 
specified model. 
Some authors find that OLS performs relatively well in comparison to experimental outcomes 
(Shadish et al., 2008), however there are a few circumstance where it may not be preferable.  Firstly, 
since OLS is a parametric, imposing a restrictive functional form may not be satisfied. This is 
particularly an issue when covariate distributions are very different between treated and control 
groups (Ferraro & Miranda, 2014). Moreover, controlling for large number of covariates in OLS 
affects outcomes, especially when sample sizes are small. Given these caveats, non-parametric 
approaches such as matching which seek to improve covariate balance and mitigate the issue of 
dimensionality are available. Matching will be discussed in detail momentarily.  
4.5 Quasi-Experimental Approach  
There are several so called quasi- experimental approaches which seek to account for selection bias 
and allow for unbiased ATT estimation. These methods have been shown to be particularly useful in 
the fields of biodiversity and conservation (Miteva et al., 2012, p 72). Deciding upon which quasi- 
experimental approach depends on which assumptions are most valid in the specific case and based 
on available data. A brief discussion of common quasi experimental approaches which include 
techniques such as difference in differences, instrumental variables, and regression discontinuity 
design will be held in Appendix A.1; however, for the moment, we can rule out these options based 
on data availability. Since in our case study, one time period of data is available, difference in 
differences is not an option. Moreover, lack of a strong and valid instrument negates use of 
instrumental variables. In addition, regression discontinuity design is not applicable  as we are 
unclear about the criteria FAS used in their decision to implement BF Income in the RDS over the 
APA. Although single difference is an option, its assumptions are strong and analysis could be 
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 considered naïve as it assumes no selection bias. Thus, this thesis will focus on matching, which will 
be discussed in the next section. 
4.6 Matching Approach  
Matching is a non-parametric method of estimating causal inference (Sekhon, 2008) and seeks to 
replicate randomization. The difference is that while randomization creates balance over all 
observable and unobservable characteristics, matching only creates balance on observable ones 
(Heinrich et al., 2010). Like OLS, matching also relies on the unconfoundedness assumption, which 
controls for observable characteristics which affect outcome. This can be an issue if the model is 
miss- specified and characteristics which are relevant in influencing treatment status are omitted. 
Thus, matching suffers from the same issue as OLS where selection bias from unobservable 
covariates remains an issue. 
Matching can be thought of as a form of weighted regression. It differs from OLS as it is non- 
parametric and seeks to improve covariate balance. Where OLS uses the full sample, matching 
generally reduces the number of control observations and only accounts for ones that are ‘good fits’ 
for the treatment group. If balance between the two groups is adequate in the full sample, OLS and 
matching results will be similar. Returning to Figure 5, we remain interested in determining the 
treatment effect. As with OLS, under matching we control for 1a) on 2); however, now we also seek 
balance across these same covariates by treatment status (2). If matching creates balance over all 
observable covariates, treatment can be considered random. If this is not possible and poor balance 
remains, then treatment status is not entirely random based on observable characteristics and 
selection bias remains.   
4.6.1 Common Support / Overlap 
In addition to unconfoundedness, matching holds a testable caveat known as common support or 
overlap.  This caveat relates to how well the control group fits the treatment group after controlling 
for observable characteristics. This condition ensures that individuals with the same outcome in 
terms of matching covariates have a positive probability of being in either the treatment or control 
group (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). Mathematically common support can be expressed as 
follows: 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 =  0 < 𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷 = 1|𝑋𝑋) < 1, where the probability (P) of receiving/ not receiving 
treatment (D) conditional on covariates X, lies between 0 and 1 respectively. Furthermore, a 
common problem is that matching techniques make balance on certain covariates worse (Sekhon, 
2008). Although analysis must account for this change over specific covariates and their theoretical 
importance, there is no consensus in the literature how to best measure balance (Diamond & 
Sekhon, 2013). 
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 4.6.2 Control Factors  
There are two reasons to select control factors in matching. The first is due to selection bias. Since 
we do not know the criteria used to implement BF Income in the RDS reserve over the APA, we 
desire factors which we believe could affect both the decision to gain treatment and our outcome. 
For example, perhaps treatment was decided upon based on RDS having better infrastructure or 
members with higher average education. In addition, since treatment assignment was not random, 
we must control for other differences in community characteristics, which enables ‘like with like’ 
comparison. Before diving into the specific data and choice of actual covariates used in this study, it 
is worthwhile to discuss general factors which meet the unconfoundedness criteria and affect the 
dependent variables. These control variables will be categorized by how they affect the dependent 
variable, rather than by type of characteristic.  
i) Ability/ Productivity 
Firstly, it is important to account for ability and productivity within a HH. These factors translate into 
efficiency in using resources to produce an output, affect HH strategy decisions, and knowledge and 
understanding of the environment in which they live. These variables represent characteristics of 
individuals within the HH that are innate or developed overtime. One could expect HH with higher 
ability or productivity to have higher incomes. 
ii) Social Capital  
As discussed in the theoretical framework, social capital positively affects income through many 
paths; however its exogeneity with respect to treatment can be questioned as one could argue that 
treatment affects social cohesion due to community involvement in the decision making process and 
implementation of the chosen ICDP. To mitigate this issue, selected covariates to proxy social capital 
must remain constant throughout the implementation of the ICDP. Thus, these covariates will not be 
affected by the ICDP implementation. 
iii) Endowment  
Endowment in the form of goods is a proxy for wealth. It affects HH ability to gain income and access 
to income generating possibilities and technology that affects productivity. Furthermore, 
endowment can be seen as a proxy for unobservable ‘past HH ability’ to generate wealth, which is 
correlated with current HH ability. Endogeneity may be an issue with these factors, as income may 
have a return effect on HH productive assets. Endogeneity can be mitigated if we assume these 
factors are costly durables and take a long time to procure.  
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 iv) Economies of Scale within HH  
It is important to account for economies of scale within a HH. These factors affect demand for 
income or assets through task specialization and resource pooling.  
v) Community Factors/ Access to Infrastructure  
These factors affect HH access to infrastructure and institutions which relate to their ability to 
generate income and assets. It also alters time allocation between different sources and thus 
changes the opportunity cost of partaking in certain activities. Moreover, community factors include 
the innate community environment and its spill over onto specific HH. We should note that this 
group of variables are slightly different to the other groups. Firstly, as the name suggests community 
factors are measured at the community level rather than the HH level which gives them less 
variation. Moreover, it also characterizes differences in the overall community environment which 
we seek to control for. 
4.6.4 Dimensionality and Balancing scores  
Matching relies on controlling for observable characteristics that affect treatment. When one is only 
controlling for a single characteristic this is straightforward; however finding a valid match based on 
a high dimensional vector of characteristics is more difficult (Heinrich et al., 2010). Introducing a 
balancing score reduces the issue of dimensionality and retains the same economic intuition of 
controlling for observable characteristics. 
4.6.5 Distance Measures 
Propensity Score Matching 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) as introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) combines all 
covariates into a scalar. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) demonstrate that when it is valid to match 
based on covariates X (that meet conditional independence assumption), it is also valid to match 
based on propensity score (PS). This method of matching provides an unbiased estimate of the 
treatment effect, which is the average outcome difference between matched (based on a scalar PS), 
treated and controls (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008; Heinrich et al., 2010). Post matching PS differences 
between treatment and control groups are an indicator of poor balance. This indicates model 
misspecification or too small a sample size as bias is asymptotically removed with PSM (Diamond & 
Sekhon, 2013). The PS is derived through running logistic regression on the treatment variable, and 
controlling for all exogenous characteristics (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). 
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 Mahalanobis Distance  
Mahalanobis Distance (MD) makes comparison between treatment and control groups through 
taking the MD between each unit i and the closest unit in the opposite group. The average (scalar) 
distance for each covariate is reported (King et al., 2011). The MD measure can be defined as 
follows:  
 
𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗� =  �(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 − 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗)𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 −  𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗) (7) 
where S is the sample covariance matrix of X used as a normalization factor, and 𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴 is the transpose 
(King et al., 2011). MD can be criticised as it regards all interactions among the covariates X as 
equally important. When X  has high dimensionality, additional covariates has difficulty in matching a 
greater number of interactions  (Stuart, 2010). Furthermore, non- normal distribution of covariates 
is also an issue (ibid).   
Genetic Matching  
Under all matching algorithms, researchers must decide on which matching covariates to include 
and how to test for balance. The Genetic Matching algorithm5 endogenizes the process of 
determining optimal weights for chosen covariates through an iterative process (Sekhon, 2008). 
These weights are chosen in order to  maximize overall balance for observed covariates (ibid). This 
approach is more general than PSM and MD, as results can replicate other approaches under certain 
circumstances. Although in reality neither of these situations are likely to occur, this generalized 
iterative form “dominates other matching methods in terms of MSE [mean squared error]” (Sekhon, 
2008, p 7).  
4.6.6 Further Matching Algorithms  
The distance measures listed above can incorporate various matching techniques including 
replacement, nearest neighbour and caliper matching each which further affect both achieved 
balance and results. In general all model specification decisions were made in order to reduce bias. 
This occurred at the expense of efficiency or variance.  
Firstly, we will consider matching with or without replacement. Replacement indicates that after a 
control unit was used, it was replaced into the set of controls for future potential matches. 
Replacement is intuitive as it allows for the closest possible match to be made which decreases bias 
because controls look more similar to treated individuals (Stuart, 2010). However replacement runs 
5 Available from the ‘rgenoud’ package in R 
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 the risk that relatively few control observations are used to construct the counterfactual (Smith & 
Todd, 2005; Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008; Khandker et al., 2010). For our study, matching with 
replacement was conducted in order to reduce bias. 
Nearest Neighbour (NN) selects the number of nearest control units used to determine the 
counterfactual. For this study, 1:1 matching was conducted, as it is intuitive that the single nearest 
neighbour provides the closest possible match for treated individuals. Although selecting multiple 
controls (or multiple NN) for each match decreases variance, it does not account for the fact some 
individuals may have many close matches while others do not (Stuart, 2010). This creates a trade-off 
between the degree of sample balance with the matched sample size (King et al., 2011).  For our 
study, 1:1 NN matching was performed in order to reduce bias. 
This issue of match proximity can be accounted for using a caliper. Calipers imply that matches 
conducted must fall within a certain threshold in terms of standard deviation. When the caliper 
criterion is not met, treatment individuals are dropped from the sample. Specifying a small caliper 
may cause many observations to be dropped (Lunt, 2014). Narrower calipers results in closer 
matches, thereby reducing systematic differences and bias; “however it may also result in the 
reduction in matched subjects, thereby increas[ing] the variance of the estimated treatment effect” 
(Austin, 2011, p 150). In general, aside from Austin who recommend using a caliper which is 0.2 of 
the pooled standard deviation of the logit of the propensity score,  a range of calipers are used in 
estimation (Lunt, 2014). For this thesis a variety of calipers on the PSM models were tested in order 
to improve fit.  
Selected Matching Approach 
Matching seeks to improve balance over our covariates. However, matching may also deteriorate 
balance over certain covariate (King et al., 2011). If this occurs, the counterfactual cannot be 
considered random over treatment status, resulting in biased outcomes. Although it can be argued 
that excluding characteristics where balance is not achieved improves balance, failing to account for 
relevant characteristics results in model misspecification and unobservable variable bias. This thesis 
falls within the latter category, whereby all relevant characteristics were selected pre matching. The 
specific matching approach was determined in order to  maximize balance, which may occur at the 
expense of covariate variance (Lee, 2013). 
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 4.6.7 Match Quality 
There is no unique measure of match balance, thus several will be explored in this thesis.  First, a 
test of joint equality of means across all covariates was conducted for each algorithm. The null 
hypothesis is of joint equality for all tests. This is an issue when conducting matching with 
replacement.  Second, t-tests were used to determine difference in means for each covariate, where 
a significant p-value is an indication of covariate imbalance. However, as Lee (2013) notes, both the 
F- test and t-test assume observation independence. Third, as suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1985), the standardized difference in means6 (also known as standardized bias) between treatment 
and controls is a strong indicator of balance. This metric is useful as it is unitless and thus accounts 
for differences in scaling between covariates. There are two specifications of standardized 
difference, including pooled and unpooled variance.7 In this study, the former will be used. It  can be 
described as the difference in sample means in treated and matched control as a percentage of the 
square root of average variances in both groups (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008, p 19).  
 SBBefore = 100 (X�1− X�0)�.5 (V1(X)∗ V0(X))   SBAfter = 100 (X�1M− X�0M)�.5 (V1M(X)∗ V0M(X)) (8) 
 SB represent the before and after standard bias, X�1and X�0 are the sample means of the treatment 
and control, and V1M(X), V0M(X), V1(X), V0(X) are the sample variances for matched and 
unmatched  groups. Rosenbaum (1985)suggest looking at variables that have at least 20% difference 
before matching, however we remain sceptical since having good balance in a covariate before 
matching does not indicate good balance after matching.  
Moreover, the standard mean difference can be manipulated in order to obtain the percent bias 
reduction. This can be simply defined as ([1 − (SBBefore SBAfter⁄ )] ∗ 100). Thus, we are normalizing 
the change in standard difference by the original before matching difference. The final two tests are 
less important in determining model performance in terms of balance, but rather indicate overall 
model fit and variance. These include, Empirical Quantile- Quantile (eQQ) mean standard difference 
which is a non-parametric test that evaluates the rank of the observations (Ho et al., 2007). As the 
mean eQQ difference shrinks to zero, so does the difference in distributions between the treatment 
and control groups.8 Lastly, the variance ratio is a metric which indicates the variance of the 
treatment group relative to the control. A variance ratio of one indicates equal variance between the 
two groups (Sekhon, 2008). Thus, a variety of measures were used to calculate match balance. The 
models which performed best in this regard were preferred for further testing and analysis. 
6 The absolute standardized mean difference was taken for comparison purposes 
7 The standard difference unpooled normalizes the mean by the SD of the treated group 
8 The KS test statistic is another measure which captures differences over the entire distribution for a covariate. However, 
this statistic is not available for all covariates, and thus will not be used. 
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 4.3.6 Testing for Robustness 
Although we seek to find an adequately balanced sample which allows for unbiased inference into 
the ATT, remaining bias in observable covariates is an issue. Furthermore, the size of bias created by 
covariate imbalance cannot be directly tested. Rather the direction of bias can be speculated. One 
recommendation to handle remaining imbalance on key covariates is to perform exact matching 
(Lee, 2013), although this technique is out of the scope of this thesis.  
Moreover, the ATT may be subject to hidden bias caused by unobserved factors which have 
explanatory power in determining treatment. In this regard, there is a model misspecification test 
known as Rosenbaum’s Bounds which accounts for relevant yet unmeasured covariates. The test 
“measures the degree of departure from random assignment of treatment” (Keele, 2010, p 7). It 
seeks to determine the magnitude of hidden bias through adding an unobserved factor that 
confounds the observed treatment effect (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). This unobserved factor 
signifies all unobservable characteristics in the model.  
This test can be illustrated as follows: Under the no bias situation, individuals with the same 
covariate values have equal probability of receiving treatment. However, when hidden bias exists, 
individuals with the same covariate value may have different probabilities of receiving treatment 
(Keele, 2010). Rosenbaum’s Bounds test uses an odds ratio captured by a sensitivity parameter 𝛤𝛤. 
There are two relevant tests which use the parameter 𝛤𝛤. Firstly, the Wilcoxon signed rank test 
compares how the p-value of the ATT changes under various thresholds of hidden bias (𝛤𝛤) relative 
to the commonly used 5% significance level (Keele, 2010). A second test is the Hodges- Lehmann test 
which incorporates the additional effect of treatment using a confidence interval. This method “can 
be roughly interpreted as the difference in medians across treatment and control groups” (Keele, 
2010, p 14).  
The literature mentions the size of Γ indicates sensitivity to unobservable factors.  Some authors 
state that  Γ <2 indicates low sensitivity to unobservable characteristics (Duvendack & Palmer-Jones, 
2012), however this appears highly cautious. Furthermore, even a low value of Γ does not 
necessarily indicate there is no effect of treatment. Rather it can be interpreted that the confidence 
interval for the effect includes zero, pointing to no significance of treatment (Becker & Caliendo, 
2007). Therefore, low values of Γ indicate caution in interpreting results, especially when 
considering that matching was conducted under untestable unconfoundedness assumption, 
available covariates, and choice of match specification.   
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 Data and Selected Variables  
Primary data was used for this study collected by Zentrum für Entwicklungforchung (ZEF), the 
University of Bonn, and the FAS. The data was collected by 6 enumerators between November 2013 
and February 2014 from the APA and RDS reserves in Amazonia, Brazil. Two separate surveys were 
conducted, including one on the HH and level and one on the community level. 
5.1 Sources and Cleaning 
The HH survey used a stratified sample with the pre survey goal to randomly obtain 15% of each 
treated RDS community and 45% from each APA control. In reality, all 19 communities in the treated 
RDS reserve were surveyed, obtaining a recorded survey proportion of 15% and 87 HH observations. 
On the other hand, from the control APA reserves only 8 of the 16 communities in the APA were 
sampled due to time constraints, and the conscious decision to leave out 3 communities due to 
known differences ethnic structure. Thus, a recorded survey proportion of 45% and 127 HH 
observations were obtained in the control communities. In sum, this lead to a total sample size of 
214. The data was recorded in Microsoft access, and converted into Stata for analysis.  
The HH questionnaire9 covered the following topics: 
1. Basic information about HH members 
− Number of members, gender, age, education,  relationship to the HH Head (HHH) 
and ethnic and religious affiliation 
1. HH Assets  
− Land (owned/controlled), housing characteristics and value for a range of durable 
goods in both 2007 and 2013  
2. Bolsa Floresta Income and Family 
− Program participation, activities  and benefits  
3. HH income 
− Agriculture (production of specific goods, costs, hours worked) 
− Livestock and animal (production of specific goods, costs, hours worked) 
− Products from the forest and environment (production of specific goods, costs, 
hours worked, family forest use) 
− Salary from business or contractual labour (type, hours, value) 
− Community work (type, hours, value) 
− Other sources (type, value) 
The second community survey, interviewed the leader of each community. Leaders were asked 
questions relating the community’s demographic distribution, access to infrastructure (including 
education, health and markets), natural resource use and availability, as well as extreme events 
within the community, community benefits received through the BFP and the decision making 
9 Contact author, or ZEF for original Portuguese survey   
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 process used to allocate them. In addition, self-reported characteristics of leadership were asked. 
This survey provided 19 observations from the treated sample and 8 from the control, providing a 
total sample of size 27 from the two reserves. 
Data Cleaning 
Missing values occurred if the respondent did not know the answer to questions, did not want to 
respond, were wrongly entered in the original questionnaire, or the question was left unanswered. 
Rigorous checks regarding inconsistencies in responses were conducted with reference to the 
primary ‘paper’ survey and the digitalized version.  
Due to the small sample size, missing values were imputed from available information rather than 
dropped. In general this was only a significant issue for the factors which were used to generate the 
dependant variables however occurred for some independent variables as well. Furthermore, there 
were many inconsistencies in reported values, which required personal judgement in order to select 
the appropriate value for analysis. This can be illustrated using the example where HH were asked 
prices, quantities and total value for a specific good.  Although the total value of output (revenue) 
should by definition correspond to the product of the price and quantity, this identity did not always 
hold. In each case, best judgement was used to correct issues. This allowed for a complete data set 
for to be obtained.  
5.2 Dependent Variables  
As per the literature, since poverty is a multidimensional concept (Alkire & Foster, 2011), several 
dependant variables were used to capture livelihood and wellbeing. Thus, for this study, two main 
continuous dependent variables, including ‘log per capita income’10 and ‘change in log assets’ or 
asset growth were tested in order to determine changes in HH livelihood and wellbeing.11 Summary 
statistics for these dependant variables before and after matching will be presented in the next 
chapter (Table 11). Furthermore, log transformations were made in order to give lower weights to 
dependent variable outliers, capture decreasing economies of scale and for ease of interpretation. 
Income can be used as a measure of welfare as it is one of the goals of the project, and provides HH 
with liquid assets for investment and livelihood needs.  In the context of this survey it was measured 
for the year preceding the 2013 survey date. Thus, our treatment effect seeks to determine if 
income between our two study groups is different after controlling for relevant covariates. On the 
10 Referred to as income from now on 
11 Another measure could include cash income. This was not included as it focuses on wage labour which would be 
understated for subsistence HH and family derived labour.  
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 other hand, the other in asset value depicts a change in the stock of HH wealth between the two 
time periods 2007 and 2013. It can be interpreted as percent asset growth. 
Assets 
We will first provide details with the calculation of our asset growth dependant variable, starting 
with  simply asset value. From equation 9), asset value (𝑉𝑉 (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)) is the sum of (𝐽𝐽) assets at time 
period (𝑡𝑡).  Furthermore, as shown in equation 10), we take the log difference of asset value 
between each of the time periods (𝑡𝑡1, 𝑡𝑡2).  Moreover, 1 was added to asset value before taking the 
logarithm in order to account for zero asset value at a certain time period. Thus, our final dependant 
variable is log change in asset value or rate of asset growth. 
 
 
𝑉𝑉 (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) = ��(𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗)𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
� 
 
(9) 
 ∆ 𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) = log�∑ (𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎2) + 1𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 � − log�∑ (𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎1) + 1𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 �  
 
(10) 
 
Before matching, asset growth has a distribution as indicated in the Figure 6 (left). It appears a 
majority of HH do not experience a change in assets, however the mean, and median are positive 
indicating positive changes in welfare. By visual inspection, one can speculate no treatment effect as 
the distributions of the dependant variable fit relatively well. However, this inspection does not 
include control covariates.  
Figure 6: Distribution of Dependant Variables (Before Matching) 
  12 
Source: own depication 
  
12 For illustrative purposes this graph omits 1 outlier for the control reserve that has a negative reported income (-1.36).  
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 Income 
Total annual HH income can be considered as the sum of direct income from production and 
subsidies from all HH members, minus the tangible costs of production (refer to Table 1). Income is 
generated from a variety of sources including agricultural products, livestock13, meat and other 
products and services derived from animals, products collected from the forest and environment, 
income from family business, contract labour, community work, and other payments.  
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = ��𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 𝐾𝐾
𝑖𝑖=1
𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
−  � �𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑊𝑊
𝑖𝑖=1
 (11) 
 
Referring to Equation 11), the first term of right hand side can be interpreted as HH revenue gained (𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖), which is the sum of J income categories that have K components irrespective of which HH 
member produced the income. The second term are the total costs (𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), which are the summed 
over (W) cost categories and (𝑋𝑋) cost components. Combing these terms yield the desired the HH 
total income (Yi). 
Furthermore, we are interested in per capita income, which requires the adult equivalent HH size (𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒) to be calculated (Equation 12). This equation seeks to explain gains from economies of 
scale within a HH. This equation can be illustrated using a sample HH. A single adult HH has an adult 
equivalence of 1, while 2 adults HH would have an adult equivalence of 1.7. Since children do not 
live alone, each additional child accounts for 0.5 adult equivalent members. Dividing 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖  by the 
number of adult equivalent members yields the desired result of per capita HH income (𝑌𝑌𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖). Lastly, 
the natural logarithm of the dependent variable was taken (log (𝑌𝑌𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) as specified in Equation 13. 
 𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 = 1 +  0.7(𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 − 1) +  0.5(𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎) log (𝑌𝑌𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖) = 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒⁄ � (12) (13) 
 
To reiterate 𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 is the adult equivalent HH size, (Yi) is the total HH income, and log (𝑌𝑌𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖) is the 
logged per capita HH income. The distribution of the income dependant variable is illustrated in 
Figure 6 (right). 
 
  
13 It should be noted that there were certain measurement issues with regard to the value of livestock variable. In the 
robustness section, this will be further tested.  
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 Table 1: Description of Income and Cost Categories 
Income Categories Description 
Agriculture 
Cereals (corn, rice, cassava (flour), tapioca flour, gum, potatoes, sweet potatoes); 
legumes (black beans, cowpea); vegetables (tomato, carrot, pepper, cucumber, garlic, 
lettuce, cabbage); fruits (mango, banana, acai, lemon, orange, watermelon, pineapple, 
coconut, soursop, coffee, cocoa); other crops (Tabaco, sugar cane, peanuts, maracuja) 
Livestock 
Including  cattle, bull, calve, buffalo (adult, young), horse (adult, young), sheep, pork, 
duck, geese, turkey, fish, rooster, chicken, rabbit, bees 
Their products and services: milk, butter, cheese, egg, leather, manure, transport, 
honey, soap 
Forest and 
Environment 
Various wood varieties; non-wood products including flora for food, medicine, 
construction; and fauna for food, pets, sale; and different species of fish 
Family  Including shop owner, vehicle mechanic, repair service , guide etc. 
Contract Labour Contract and salaried work from on and off-farm employment 
Collective Management of community forest, tourism, aviculture, Brazil nuts, fish, agriculture 
Other Sources 
Income from rent, insurance, maternity benefits, pension, inheritance, subsidies from 
BFF and other support programs  
 
Cost Categories Description 
Agriculture 
Input costs including seeds, manure, fertilizer, pesticides,  tools, machinery,  fuel, 
labour, transportation, land lease etc. 
Livestock Labour, materials, feed, rented material, production material etc. 
Forest and Fish Labour, transport 
Family Business Labour 
Community work Labour, material, transport and marketing 
Source: HH Questionnaire and accompanying code book 
Figure 7 demonstrates the low heterogeneity in mean per capita income source by quantile and reserve.  HH 
generally obtain most of their income from ‘Other sources’ and ‘Contract Labour’. Key differences between 
the two reserves include the negative percent of Agricultural profit in the poorest quantile of the control 
reserve. Moreover, as expected, the treated reserve has a larger proportion of income derived from 
‘Collective Sources’ as it is directly attributable to treatment.   
Figure 7: Per Capita Income by Income Source over Quantiles and by Reserve 
 
Source:  Own depiction 
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 5.3 Treatment Variable 
The treatment variable indicates that the community received the BF Income component at some 
point prior to survey. This decision to implement treatment was on the reserve level, where the RDS 
reserve implemented BF Income starting in 2007, while the APA had not at the time of survey. 
Treatment was applied on the community level, where the decision of which ICDP to pursue and 
how to allocate funds was communally made. For our purposes treatment is a binary variable 
applied to each HH and indicates if the community received the BF Income or not. As discussed in 
the theoretical framework, treatment can affect our dependent variable through changes in labour 
allocation, changes in purchasing of goods, social capital formation and economies of scale in 
production which allow for greater income source diversification. 
5.4 Independent Variables  
Twenty independent covariates were selected to match upon, including a range of binary and 
continuous variables as per the literature. They were selected as they meet the conditional 
independence assumption and are exogenous. For explanation purposes, covariates will be 
categorized by how they affect income in the same manner as in the theoretical framework. It 
should be noted that certain covariates can be used as proxies for multiple categories; however this 
is not an issue.14 Refer to Appendix A.2 for further details concerning variable description.  
i) Ability/ Productivity  
In order to capture differences in HH ability and productivity, a range of variables relating to the 
HHH were used.  These variables include age, sex, level of education and weather they were born in 
interior. Furthermore, the maximum level of HH education was considered. These variables are 
exogenous to treatment and have no issue of reverse causality with our dependent variables. They 
capture cultural norms, experience, connections within the community and environmental 
awareness which are used as proxies for productivity and ability.  
 
ii) Social Capital  
Moreover, variables which reflect social capital were accounted for. Although one could argue that 
social capital is affected by treatment, selected covariates are exogenous to treatment as they can 
be considered constant or changing at a constant rate over the course of treatment. Variables 
selected include HH ethnic and religious majority status and distance inhabitants live from the 
community’s centre. These covariates capture ties within the community, business opportunities, 
14 In addition covariates were generated in a way which did not generate missing values or rather infinite values due to 
ratios with zero denominator values.  
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 and development of business practices which are aligned with sustainable resource use regulations 
from the reserve. 
 
iii) Endowment  
Moreover, endowment in resources affects income generating possibilities. Consideration in 
choosing variables that remain exogenous to treatment was made. Covariates selected include 
lagged asset value (2007), access to electricity, land owned and the HH participated in BFF. Firstly, 
lagged asset value affects income possibility through physical capital, as well as capturing 
unobservable characteristics (business sense and ability to gain resources) that enabled prior HH 
asset accumulation. Secondly, access to electricity affects income through productivity and work 
hours available. Moreover, land ownership affects income through productive assets. By 
assumption, there is no issue of reverse causality since electricity requires time and significant 
resources to connect. Similarly, land can be considered constant throughout treatment as it requires 
significant saving and time to purchase. Lastly, BFF which strongly affects our dependant variables as 
it is a direct financial transfer was considered through two variables using both a both dummy 
variable for participation and a continuous one for the number of years the HH had participated. BFF 
can be considered exogenous as all HH in both reserves qualify.  
iv) Economies of Scale within HH  
HH earning capacity was considered through economies of scale within the HH. Weber at al. (2011)  
highlight the importance of HH labour constraints as it reflects the ability to invest time in 
alternative income generating possibilities. Since our dependent variable accounts for the number of 
members in the HH, other covariates including the dependency ratio and the number of reported 
days sick were included. These variables are exogenous to treatment and have no issue of reverse 
causality with our dependent variables. 
 
v) Community Factors/ Access to Infrastructure 
Ease of access to infrastructure is an important attribute to consider as it reflects forgone income. 
Variables which reflect the opportunity cost of travel include distance to durables market and time 
to primary education and health facilities. Although these variables may have changed over the 
course of implementation of BF Income, the change could be attributed to BF Social and Association 
which were equally applied to both treated and control communities. Moreover, the variables 
environmental shocks and number of years since the community was founded were included to proxy 
the community environment which affects HH welfare.    
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 Results 
This section will begin with a discussion of the issue of balance, as this is the primary testable means 
of measuring the effectiveness of matching. Given the covariates chosen based on theoretical 
grounds, various models will be tested (section 6.1.2). We are most interested in the ATT from the 
model which performs best in terms of balance, which will be presented in section 6.2. Further 
testing of the selected models will be conducted in the following robustness chapter. Analysis was 
conducted using both R and Stata. 
6.1 Balance 
6.1.1 Balance Before Matching 
One measure of balance before matching is the pooled normalized difference in means adapted 
from Weber et al. (2011). This difference can be understood in terms of standard deviations, where 
a 0.1 standard deviation threshold is considered small. Referring to the final column of Table 2, as 
much as 16 out of our 20 covariates fall above this threshold and 12 lie above 0.2 standard 
deviations. The covariates relating land ownership and number of years the HH has participated in 
the BFF program appears to have the worst balance pre matching. In particular these differences in 
normalized mean provide evidence that using OLS on the full sample will provide biased results. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics: Balance Before Matching 
  
Control 
 
Treat  
 
  
mean SE mean SE pooled difference 
HHH sex 
 
0.17 0.37 0.14 0.35 0.11 
HHH age  
 
47.34 16.82 46.61 15.47 0.06 
HHH edu  
 
3.97 3.48 5.06 3.97 0.42 
max HH edu 
 
6.93 3.58 8.36 3.73 0.55 
dep ratio 
 
0.36 0.27 0.33 0.26 0.17 
days sick 
 
13.43 29.77 11.58 21.98 0.10 
interior 
 
0.77 0.42 0.79 0.41 0.07 
eth. majority 
 
0.94 0.24 0.9 0.31 0.21 
rel. majority 
 
0.74 0.44 0.79 0.41 0.18 
community year 24.23 8.67 30.06 15.48 0.67 
env shock 0.09 0.28 0.28 0.45 0.72 
health time 0.46 1.21 0.27 0.25 0.29 
edu time 
 
0.11 0.21 0.1 0.3 0.02 
distance centre 1.25 2.36 0.87 1.99 0.25 
distance mkt 59.09 24.9 43.5 24.46 0.85 
asset 07 
 
8.33 2.88 8.72 2.54 0.20 
electricity 
 
0.93 0.66 1.13 0.55 0.45 
BFF 
 
0.48 0.5 0.75 0.44 0.11 
BFF year 
 
1.14 1.31 2.8 1.86 0.77 
land 
 
22.8 52.44 27.53 70.12 1.34 
Observations 127 
 
87 
  Source: Own calculation conducted in Stata  
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 Binary Participation Models 
Another measure of pre- matching balance can be determined from the binary regression model on 
the treatment dummy. The probit (from the normal distribution) and logit (logistic distribution) were 
used. The difference between these distributions is that the probit has relatively a fatter tail 
distribution, and thus is more likely to capture outliers (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). For this reason 
the probit model will be considered in estimation. Coefficients and their signs were consistent 
between the two estimates for significant covariates (refer to Table 3).  
Normally, the binary regression is used to develop a PS rather than for interpretive purposes, 
however from one perspective, significance indicates pre- match imbalance between covariates. 
From this study, significant variables include maximum HH education, total distance to market, as 
well the number of years the HH partook in BFF. In particular the sign and significance of these last 
two terms are surprising as it indicates that communities with a lower average time participating in 
BFF, and thus less contact with the BFP, are more likely to participate in BF Income treatment.  
Table 3: Binary Regression Model on Treatment 
 
Probit 
 
Logit 
 
 
Coef SE Coef SE 
HHH sex -0.069 0.821 -0.194 0.732 
HHH age 0.005 0.619 0.014 0.438 
HHH edu -0.011 0.783 0.007 0.921 
max edu 0.087* 0.021 0.151* 0.023 
dep ratio 0.088 0.871 0.288 0.766 
days sick -0.004 0.384 -0.006 0.518 
interior 0.172 0.535 0.279 0.563 
eth. maj -0.154 0.712 -0.277 0.695 
rel. maj 0.198 0.478 0.392 0.441 
community year 0.034* 0.043 0.051 0.075 
env shock 0.472 0.123 0.861 0.11 
health time 0.05 0.754 0.053 0.847 
edu time 0.675 0.155 0.756 0.393 
distance centre 0.019 0.698 0.023 0.798 
distance mkt  -0.016** 0.002 -0.030** 0.001 
asset 07 -0.027 0.565 -0.027 0.749 
electricity 0.297 0.132 0.428 0.219 
BFF -1.711*** 0 -4.202*** 0 
BFF year 0.749*** 0 1.658*** 0 
land 0.001 0.693 0.002 0.574 
Constant -1.873 0.058 -3.374 0.052 
Observations 214 
 
214 
 Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Source: Own calculation conducted in Stata 
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 These two indicators of pre match balance correspond to one another. Findings demonstrate that 
pre matching, control and treatment groups are quite different across several covariates. 
Furthermore, match imbalance can be illustrated graphically through plotting the density by 
propensity score (Figure 8). Here we see the pre matching PS distribution between the treated and 
control groups are quite different (left). Figure 8 (right) provides a preview of the potential gains in 
balance by performing matching.15  
Figure 8: Propensity Score Distribution 
 
Source: own depiction conducted in R and Stata  
Note: Probit model, no caliper, with replacement 
 
6.1.2 Balancing Tests Post Matching 
This section will provide the results of various matching techniques in terms of balance. We are most 
interested in the ATT from the models that perform best in terms of balance. The matching 
techniques implemented include PS matching with both probit and logit specifications, with and 
without caliper, however only probit outcomes will be primarily reported. A variety of calipers were 
tested, where 0.1 SD were selected. This caliper balances the issue of loss of treatment observations 
with improving match quality. In addition, MD and the iterative Genetic matching algorithm were 
used. Furthermore, since there are no well-regarded unique and conclusive indicators of balance 
(Diamond & Sekhon, 2013), a variety of measures were used in comparing matching algorithms 
including: 
a) Joint and unjoint difference in means 
b) Standardized difference (pooled), and the percent bias reduction  
c) eQQ mean difference 
d) Variance ratio  
15 It should be noted that these distribution graphs are only possible for PSM as other techniques due not estimate a PS. 
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 For a full set of results, refer to Appendix A.3. For the purposes of explanation, only visual 
interpretation and summary statistics will be presented in the text. 
Number of Observations 
Before looking at the post matching results, it is important to discuss how the number of 
observations changes under different approaches. The number of controls used is important as few 
controls may be important in developing the counterfactual and thus act as strong drivers of 
outcomes. Since our before matching balance is not very strong, one can suspect that relatively few 
observations (especially at the high PS range) are repeatedly used to match treatment individuals.  
Considering Table 4, the weighted number of treatment observations is generally our treatment 
sample size of 87, unless a caliper was specified. In this case observations were dropped as no 
control was available within the specified bandwidth. The unweighted control accounts for multiple 
observations which have the same PS outcomes.  The notion that few control observations drive 
outcomes is verified; where at most 50 different observations were used.  Furthermore, under PS 
matching, single observations were used as much as 25 times or 29%16 of the total required sample. 
MD and Genetic matching use greater number of unique controls and have a lower maximum, which 
are indicators of greater variance in developing the counterfactual. 
Table 4: Control Observations under Various Matching Approaches 
  Probit Logit Probit (caliper) 
Logit 
(caliper) MD 
Gen 
Match 
No. controls used 32 34 32 34 49 50 
Max no. times single control used 25 27 17 22 10 5 
Unweighted no. of Treated Obs 90 96 74 87 87 87 
weighted no. of Treated Obs 87 87 71 72 87 87 
Remark: Own Calculation conducted in R 
a.i) F-test  
Keeping differences in sample size in mind, various tests were conducted in order to determine post 
matching balance. Firstly, a test of joint equality of means (known as F-test or Hotelling test) across 
all covariates was conducted. The null hypothesis of joint mean equality for all models (including the 
comparison of pre matched controls with treatment) was not rejected as shown in Table 5. This 
indicates that in combination we cannot reject that covariate means are dissimilar. However, lack of 
observation independence for the F and t-tests remains an issue as matching with replacement was 
conducted (Lee, 2013). Thus, the results from these tests should not be overemphasised. 
Furthermore, although the F- test comparing pre matched treatment and control was not rejected, 
16 The single control observation is used as a match for 25 of the 87 treatment observations  
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 this does not indicate lack of appropriateness of matching to further reduce bias as after all, our goal 
is to improve overall balance. 
Table 5: P- value from F- test 
  before probit probit (caliper) MD 
Gen 
Match 
p- value 0.8696 0.7295 0.7295 0.8942 0.516 
Remark: Own Calculation conducted in R 
 
a.ii) T-test: Difference of means  
For each covariate a t-test was performed to determine difference in means, where a significant p-
value is an indication of covariate imbalance. This metric demonstrates that matching has been 
somewhat unsuccessful as the number of significant variables in the Probit PSM approach (without 
calipers) has been made worse in comparison to the before matching base case. Use of calipers, as 
well as MD and Genetic matching appear to perform marginally stronger with fewer significant 
covariates (refer to Figure 9).  
Figure 9: P-  value of difference in Mean (T- test) 
 
Source: own depiction 
Remark: Significant variables which lie to the left of the 10% (solid line) and 5% (dashed line)    
 
Table 6 provides summary statistics for this test across all 20 covariates. The count variables 
indicates the number of variables that fall within this range. In many cases, almost half of our 
covariates have remaining imbalance according to the difference in mean. As mentioned, not too 
much weight is put on these results due to lack of observational independence.   
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 Table 6: P-  value of difference in Mean (T- test) Summary Statistics 
 
Before 
Matching Probit 
Probit 
(caliper)  MD Gen 
count if < 0.1 9 10 9 7 10 
mean 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 
median 0.25 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.07 
var 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.12 
Remark: Own Calculation conducted in R 
 
b) Standard Difference in Means (Pooled Variance) 
The standardized difference in means between treatment and controls is a strong indicator of 
balance. Our results indicate that all matching specifications reduce absolute standard mean 
difference. As shown by Figure 10, a reduction in pooled difference in means under all matching 
approaches occurred. MD and Genetic matching algorithms perform best, with the most units lying 
proximate to zero. The latter is expected, as Genetic Matching explicitly seeks to maximize this 
metric of balance.  Summary statistics for this metric, reported in Table 7 demonstrate MD and 
Genetic matching have the fewest variables with large remaining bias according to Rosenbaum’s 
20% threshold.  
Figure 10: Absolute Standard Mean Difference (Pooled SD) 
 
 
Source: own depiction 
Table 7: Absolute Standard Mean Difference (Pooled SD) Summary Statistics 
 
Before 
Matching Probit 
Probit 
(caliper) MD Gen 
mean 0.38 0.29 0.26 0.20 0.22 
median 0.23 0.28 0.24 0.14 0.15 
count if < 0.2 8 8 8 15 13 
Remark: Own Calculation conducted in R 
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 The standard mean difference can be manipulated in order to obtain the percent bias reduction. 
Results demonstrate that matching under all approaches reduces bias, which creates incentive for 
conducting this procedure (refer to Figure 11). Although bias reduction is quite substantial, one 
should be careful about simply minimizing mean bias as it can be driven by a few variables. For 
example, although the probit models has a large mean bias reduction, many covariates increased in 
bias relative to the no match situation. On the other hand, MD and genetic matching both reduced 
bias quite substantially and have fewer variables where balance deteriorated. When looking at the 
specific variables where imbalance remains (refer to Appendix A.3), although MD performs better in 
terms of number of balanced covariates, the key variable of market distance has much better 
balance in Genetic matching, with a pooled standardized mean difference of 0.21 compared to 0.46. 
According to Table 8, MD and Genetic matching have the fewest increases in percent growth in 
absolute standard mean relative to the before matching case. Furthermore, they have achieved 
large overall bias reduction according to the mean and median. Once again, not too much weight 
should be placed on the mean, due to large percent bias reduction in specific covariates. 
Figure 11: Percent Reduction in Bias (Pooled SD) 
 
Source: own depiction 
Table 8: Percent Change in Standard Mean Difference (Absolute/ Pooled SD) Summary Statistics 
  
Before 
Matching Probit 
Probit 
(caliper) MD Gen 
count if < -20% 0 10 10 13 13 
count if > 0% 0 10 10 5 5 
count if > 20% 0 7 9 4 4 
mean 0 -598 -339 -357 -1067 
median 0 -2 -1 -108 -123 
Remark: Own Calculation conducted in R 
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 c) eQQ mean difference 
This test represents overall model fit. On average, the only approach which improves the eQQ is MD, 
while Genetic matching also has a negative median eQQ . Furthermore, out of our 20 covariates, 
many, and in some cases a majority of covariates are made worse in terms of this measure of 
distribution equality. To a degree, this result can be attributed to reduction in sample size of the 
control. Summary statistics for this test are presented in Table 9.  
 
Table 9: eQQ Summary Statistics 
  
Before 
matching Probit 
Probit 
(caliper) MD Gen 
count if > 0 20 20 20 19 19 
mean 2.08 3.26 2.71 1.97 1.99 
median 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.34 0.42 
Remark: Own Calculation conducted in R 
d) Variance ratio 
Lastly, the variance ratio is a metric which indicates the variance of the treatment relative to that off 
the control. Since variance reduction is not a goal in matching, results are not highly weighted in 
analysis. The results, demonstrate the variance ratio performs best under probit and Genetic 
matching specifications as specified in Table 10.  
 
Table 10: Variance Ratio Summary Statistics 
 
Before 
matching Probit 
Probit 
(caliper) MD Gen 
count if 1/2 < VAR < 2 5 10 6 5 5 
mean 1.23 1.74 1.44 5.01 1.57 
median 0.95 1.32 1.19 1.25 1.39 
Remark: Own Calculation conducted in R 
 
Overall, MD and Genetic matching appear to have had a relatively strong effect in terms of 
improving balance. Both metrics perform well in terms of number of unique observations in the 
matching procedure, with relatively low maximum number of times a single control was used. 
Moreover, both perform well in terms of standardized bias reduction. In terms of overall 
distribution, MD and Genetic matching had a mean difference eQQ close to zero. Thus, although bias 
is reduced, the difference in means and difference in standard bias tests indicate that there are still 
quite a few variables where imbalance remains, even under our preferred approaches. In some 
cases, matching made balance worse.  Therefore, although we will now proceed with estimating the 
treatment effect, with specific interest in MD and Genetic Matching results, our findings should be 
interpreted with caution.  
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 6.2 Summary Statistics for Dependant Variable          
Before diving into results of our measure of additionality, we will briefly discuss summary statistics 
of our two dependant variables for our matched and unmatched sample over treatment status 
(refer to Table 11). We will ignore the dependant variable income2 for the moment which will be 
applied as a robustness test.  
Starting with our asset growth dependant variable, the full sample mean of the two groups appear 
similar (1.24 for the control and 1.36 for the treated) with relatively high standard deviation. When 
controlling for observable characteristics, the mean for the control group reduces (for all models 
except probit with caliper) and the standard deviation decreases as well. 
On the other hand, with our income dependant variable, considering the full sample, the mean of 
the two groups are similar (8.60 for the control and 8.66 for the treated) with relatively high 
standard deviation. Relative to this base case, post matching the mean income under all matching 
models except Genetic matching decreases the standard deviation. Thus, matching appears to alter 
the distribution of the treatment and control groups and generally lowers the variance relative to 
the full sample. The degree these distributional differences are significant will be tested with OLS 
and various matching approaches in the remainder of this chapter. 
Table 11: Dependant Variable Summary Statistics by Treatment Status 
  
Full sample Probit 
 
Probit 
(Caliper) MD 
 
Gen 
 
  
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Control 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 log diff assets 1.24 2.63 0.94 1.90 1.59 2.60 0.94 1.90 0.78 1.71 
log per cap income 8.60 1.13 8.76 0.61 8.67 0.56 8.76 0.61 8.57 1.24 
log per cap income2 8.62 1.13 8.78 0.61 8.72 0.58 8.78 0.61 8.59 1.24 
Treat 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 log diff assets 1.36 2.29 1.36 2.29 1.35 2.19 1.36 2.29 1.36 2.29 
log per cap income 8.66 0.85 8.66 0.85 8.58 0.92 8.66 0.85 8.66 0.85 
log per cap income2 8.68 0.85 8.68 0.85 8.60 0.91 8.68 0.85 8.68 0.85 
Total 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 log diff assets 1.29 2.49 1.15 2.11 1.47 2.40 1.15 2.11 1.07 2.04 
log per cap income 8.63 1.02 8.71 0.74 8.63 0.76 8.71 0.74 8.62 1.06 
log per cap income2 8.64 1.02 8.73 0.74 8.66 0.76 8.73 0.74 8.63 1.06 
Source: Own calculation conducted in Stata 
Remark: Refer to Table 4 for observation count 
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 6.2 OLS (full sample) 
As mentioned, OLS also relies on the assumption of conditional independence to matching (Bonin, 2014). 
However, OLS uses the full sample, while matching uses a subset of control observations and sometimes a 
subset of treatment observations if a calliper was specified. Since pre match imbalance appears to be an 
issue, results from full sample OLS should not be given too much consideration.  
This regression analysis (Table 11) provides several interesting findings. Firstly, in terms of our 
measure of additionality, the treatment effect, the income dependant variable has a negative sign 
and is insignificant. Furthermore, there are several point estimates that have counterintuitive signs 
including maximum education, time to health facility and centre of community, HH assets in 2007 
and participation in BFF. However, none of these variables are significantly different from zero. The 
significant variables include HHH age and the dependency ratio. The former can be interpreted as a 
one unit increase in HHH age causes a 1% increase in income.  
In terms of our asset growth dependant variable, the treatment variable has a positive sign and is 
insignificant. Furthermore, HHH education and ethnic majority status have counterintuitive signs, 
although have insignificant p- values. As expected, lagged assets are a strong and significant 
predictor of asset change as lower asset values in 2007 create greater difference in asset value. 
Access to electricity is strong predictor of asset growth indicating a 33%17 growth. Moreover, the 
maximum HH education has a positive effect of 7.5%.  
Table 12: OLS Regression (full sample) 
 
Income 
 
Asset  
 
Coef SE Coef SE 
treatment -0.26 0.18 0.27 0.15 
HHH sex 0.06 0.19 -0.15 0.16 
HHH age 0.013* 0.01 0.00 0.01 
HHH edu 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.02 
max edu -0.02 0.02 0.072*** 0.02 
dep ratio -0.848* 0.33 -0.33 0.28 
days sick 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
interior 0.21 0.18 0.06 0.15 
eth. maj 0.13 0.26 -0.10 0.22 
rel. maj 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.14 
community year 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
env shock -0.01 0.20 -0.04 0.17 
health time -0.06 0.08 -0.09 0.07 
edu time 0.40 0.29 -0.03 0.25 
distance centre -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 
17 Calculated as the effect of dummy on Y is 100[exp(-coef) - 1]   (Halvorsen & Palmquist, 1980). This method of calculating 
treatment effect will be used throughout the results section. 
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 distance mkt  0.00 0.00 0.005* 0.00 
asset 07 -0.01 0.03 -0.875*** 0.02 
electricity 0.07 0.12 0.283** 0.10 
BFF -0.29 0.30 -0.36 0.25 
BFF year 0.17 0.09 0.12 0.08 
land 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Constant 7.882*** 0.57 7.602*** 0.48 
 
Source: Own calculation 
Note: p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
6.3 Matching Results 
Due to uneven balance between the treated and control group, the sign and significance of our ATT 
should be more accurate after performing matching.  Recall we are most interested in the MD and 
Genetic matching models as they have demonstrate better balance across discussed metrics. Our 
ATT on the dependant variable per capita income is presented in Table 13. One can see that our ATT 
for the income dependant variable is insignificantly different across all matching algorithms. This can 
be interpreted as there is no significant effect of treatment when comparing the treated and 
matched control samples. Although the coefficient signs vary across matching algorithms, 
coefficients remain small and insignificant.  
Table 13: Treatment Effect Income 
 
 Probit 
Probit 
(caliper) MD 
Gen 
Match 
ATT -0.01 -0.05 -0.10 0.05 
SEa 0.24 0.19 0.16 0.14 
p-value 0.96 0.80 0.53 0.73 
N  87 71 87 87 
Remark: Own Calculation conducted in R 
a Abadie and Imbins Standard Error 
 
In terms of the ATT of the dependant variable asset growth (presented in Table 14), our models 
demonstrate more significant results. The PSM models have negative coefficients and are 
insignificant. This can be in interpreted as there is no found significant change in assets growth 
between the treatment and control groups due to treatment. However, when applying MD, the ATT 
is significant at the 12% level indicating a 51% increase in asset growth due to treatment. The 10% 
significant level is commonly reported, thus MD falls slightly outside of this range. Genetic matching 
has both a larger estimate and is highly significant. In this case , treatment causes asset value to 
increase by 65%. It should be noted that the standard error is the so called Abadie and Imbens 
robust standard error. 
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 Table 14: Treatment Effect Asset Growth 
 
Probit Probit (caliper) MD 
Gen 
Match 
ATT -0.08 -0.23 0.41 0.50 
SEa 0.85 0.64 0.26 0.16 
p-value 0.92 0.72 0.12 0.00 
N 87 71 87 87 
Remark: Own Calculation conducted in R 
a Abadie and Imbins Standard Error 
 
6.4 OLS (matched sample) 
Furthermore, post matching OLS was conducted which further controls for observable covariates 
and reduces standard error (refer to Table 15). The sample size of the control group is reduced to 
correspond with that of the treatment. For the income dependant variable the coefficient size of 
treatment gets larger (more negative). Under this specification, market distance has a 
counterintuitive sign and is significant. This implies further travel to market increases income. On the 
other hand, when considering our asset growth, the p- values of treatment increases making both 
models insignificant at the standard levels.  This can be interpreted as no significant effect of 
treatment on asset growth. For our asset growth dependant variable, significant coefficients include 
maximum HH education, lagged asset value and access to electricity which corresponds to our full 
sample OLS results.  
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 Table 15: Post Matching OLS 
Gen Matching 
    
MD 
   
 
Income 
 
Asset 
 
Income 
 
Asset 
 
 
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
treatment -0.23 0.15 0.17 0.16 -0.23 0.15 0.17 0.16 
HHH sex -0.04 0.17 -0.28 0.19 -0.04 0.17 -0.28 0.19 
HHH age 0.01* 0.01 0 0.01 0.01* 0.01 0 0.01 
HHH edu 0 0.02 0 0.02 0 0.02 0 0.02 
max edu -0.02 0.02 0.06* 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.06* 0.02 
dep ratio -0.42 0.29 -0.42 0.32 -0.42 0.29 -0.42 0.32 
days sick 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
interior 0.01 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.01 0.16 0.13 0.17 
eth. maj 0.08 0.21 -0.32 0.24 0.08 0.21 -0.32 0.24 
rel. maj 0.35* 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.35* 0.15 0.14 0.17 
community- 
year 0 0 -0.01 0.01 0 0 -0.01 0.01 
env shock -0.08 0.14 -0.19 0.15 -0.08 0.14 -0.19 0.15 
health time 0.26 0.34 -0.08 0.38 0.26 0.34 -0.08 0.38 
edu time 0.41 0.24 0.14 0.27 0.41 0.24 0.14 0.27 
distance 
centre -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 
mkt distance 0.01* 0 0 0 0.01* 0 0 0 
asset 07 0.04 0.03 -0.85*** 0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.85*** 0.03 
electricity -0.13 0.11 0.33** 0.12 -0.13 0.11 0.33** 0.12 
land 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BFF -0.15 0.25 -0.45 0.28 -0.15 0.25 -0.45 0.28 
BFF year 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.08 
Constant 7.30*** 0.52 8.32*** 0.58 7.30*** 0.52 8.32*** 0.58 
Observations 174 
 
174 
 
174 
 
174 
 Source: Own Calculation 
Note:  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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 Robustness 
7.1 Issues of Bias 
As demonstrated from the balancing tests, although matching reduced standardized bias for 
observable covariates, it does not do this uniformly across all variables. Furthermore, imbalance 
remains even after matching. This discussion relates back to equation 4) and 5) of ATT. Our estimate 
will be biased if 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(0)|𝑋𝑋,𝐷𝐷 = 1] −  𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(0)|𝑋𝑋,𝐷𝐷 = 0]  ≠ 0, where the first term is unobservable. 
For this reason, we can only speculate the direction of bias. The first sub section of this chapter will 
discuss the direction of remaining covariate imbalance in terms of creating bias in our results. Table 
15 summarizes results of the discussion. The second section discusses issues of bias from 
unobservable variables. In combination, this helps illustrate if our ATT results are overestimated or 
underestimated.  
7.1.1 Bias from Observed Variables 
This discussion will include variables where a significant different remain post matching based on the 
t-test results and standardized differences. These results are reported in Table A.3 of the appendix. 
Furthermore a synopsis of the results from this section is reported in Table 16. 
i) Ability/ Productivity 
Innate ability or productivity was accounted for by four variables (HHH age, sex, HHH education, 
HHH born in the interior and maximum HH education). Age and maximum HH education had 
remaining imbalance and thus could promote bias. Firstly, the variable maximum HH education is 
positively correlated with income. Since our control group has a lower mean than the treated group, 
our ATT is overstated. Secondly, HHH age is also positively correlated with income. Since our control 
group has a lower mean than the treated group, our ATT may be overstated. Thus, ability or 
productivity is likely overstated. 
ii) Social Capital 
HH majority ethnic status within the community is a variable that captures social capital a factor also 
accounted for by 3 other covariates (religious status, distance from the community centre, and years 
since the community was founded). Being a part of the ethnic majority implies gains in social capital 
which is positively correlated with income. Post matching imbalance show that the control group has 
a significantly higher mean relative to than the treated group, thus income of the control is higher 
than it should be and our ATT could be understated. 
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 iii) Endowment 
Endowment is measured by lagged assets, electricity, land and BFF (2 covariates). BFF has an effect 
on income as this direct financial transfer allows HH to invest in productive assets, training and 
education, and enhances the range of available decisions for a HH. The variable where imbalance 
remains is the number of years the family has been participating in BFF. This variable does not have 
a strong effect on effect on current income; rather it is highly important for our asset growth 
dependant variable. Early or longer BFF participation could allow for savings and pooling of 
resources in order to obtain assets. Our results demonstrate that the control group has participated 
in BFF for significantly fewer years relative to the treated group. Thus, asset growth in particular in 
the control is understated, which results in overstating our ATT based on the endowment factor.18 
v)  Community Factors/ Access to Infrastructure 
Readers should be reminded that this group indicates variables that were calculated on the 
community level and extrapolated down to the HH one for comparative purposes. Thus, these 
variables have fewer observations and less variation, making balance more difficult to achieve.  
There are several variables where post matching imbalance remains for community factors. Firstly, 
travel time reflects ease of access to institutions. Greater travel time imposes a cost (negatively 
correlated with income) HH reflecting forgone wage. Furthermore, time to health facilities in the 
control group has a significantly higher mean relative to the treated group. Thus, the control group’s 
outcome is understated and our ATT is likely overstated.  Similar logic can be applied with the 
market distance variable. Since the control group has a further travel distance relative to the 
treated, the control’s opportunity cost of performing market transactions is higher than the treated 
group. Thus, income is understated and our ATT results are likely overstated. 
Lastly, the number of years the community has existed can be categorized as an indicator of 
unobservable factors which relate to how a community functions. Older communities are expected 
to have a higher average income. Our results demonstrate that the control group has lower mean 
number of years than the treatment group, resulting in income being understated in the control 
group. This implies that our ATT potentially overstated. Therefore all these imbalances in observable 
community variables point toward these overestimating our ATT. 
  
18 Note, there was no factor in iv) where imbalance remained, therefore it will not be discussed  
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 Table 16: Direction of Bias due to Observable Covariate Imbalance 
Category 
Number 
Variable with Unequal Mean 
post matching 
Sign of 
theoretical 
correlation with 
Income 
Observed Mean 
Control < than 
mean Treat 
Direction of Bias of 
ATT 
i) HHH age (+) Yes Overstated 
i) Max HH Education (+) Yes Overstated 
ii) Ethnic Majority (+) No Understated 
iii) Years participating in BFF (+) Yes Overstated 
v) Time to health facilities (-) No Overstated 
v) Market Distance (-) No Overstated 
v) Year Community Exist (+) Yes Overstated 
Source: own depiction 
As indicated in the prior discussion and summarized in Table 16, the overall bias resulting from 
remaining imbalance demonstrates that our treatment effect is likely overstated. This implies a 
decrease in significance in ATT.  
7.1.2 Bias from Unobserved Variables 
As illustrated in the empirical approach, Rosenbaum’s bounds test enables us to test for the degree 
unobservable bias affects the ATT using an empirical measure of robustness. This test is particularly 
relevant for the asset growth which was found to be significant in terms ATT. Firstly, the Wilcoxen 
test determines the degree of sensitivity significant (upper bound) and insignificant (lower bound) 
results have to hidden bias. The upper bound is generally the more important indicator, where 
confirmed by our data, insignificant ATT from matching resulted in an upper bound of in Γ=1.19 
Genetic matching on the assets dependant variable is most interesting as it was found to be highly 
significant. In terms of Table 17, at the 5% significance level, Γ= 1.60. This can be interpreted as the 
following: if the odds of an individual receiving treatment increase by 60% due to differences in 
unobserved covariates (holding matched covariates constant), assets will no longer be significant. 
This indicates some robustness to unobserved characteristics. Conversely, the MD model is much 
less robust to unobservable variable bias with a 10% change in treatment status causing our 
inference to change. This low robustness to unobservable factors is unsurprising given that MD has a 
p-value ATT for asset growth of 0.12. 
Table 17: Robustness to Bias Wilcoxen Signed Rank Test:  
   Value of Γ when significant at the 5% level 
 Probit 
Probit 
(Caliper) MD Gen 
Income   (1.5) (1.42) (1.22) (1.35) 
Assets (1.33) (1.38) 1.10 1.60 
Remark: Lower Bounds are in parentheses, while Upper Bounds are not 
 Own Calculation conducted in R 
19 Theoretically at Γ=1, the matched p-value should be replicated. Although our results do not demonstrate this precisely, 
significance does not change.  Keele notes, this issue could which could be attributed to outliers (Keele, 2010).   
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 Another test for unobservable selection bias is the Hodges-Lehmann test which considers the 
additive effect from treatment. It can roughly be interpreted as the difference in medians between 
treatment and control groups. Once again, Γ =1, indicates the variable had an insignificant ATT from 
matching, as indicated for all our approaches using the Income dependant variables. Referring to 
Table 17, considering the asset growth dependent variable under the MD and Genetic matching 
specifications, both of these become more robust relative to the Wilcoxen test.  The interpretation is 
similar to above. For Genetic matching, one can conclude doubling the likelihood of treatment 
caused by an unobservable characteristic which also affects asset accumulation (while holding 
observed covariates constant) would have no effect on the significance of our dependant variable. 
 
Table 18: Robustness to Bias Hodges-Lehmann test:  
   Critical value of Γ where confidence interval includes zero 
 Probit  
Probit 
(Caliper) MD Gen 
Income   1.001 1.001 1.25 1.001 
Assets 1.122 1.116 1.31 2.21 
Remark: Own Calculation conducted in R 
 
Overall, the dependant variable of asset growth seems to be reasonably robust to hidden bias under 
Genetic matching, and to a much lower degree under MD. Robustness further increases when 
outliers are controlled for in the Hodges-Lehmann test. Several unobservable variables that could 
cause bias could be savings and entrepreneurship ability (Duvendack & Palmer-Jones, 2012).  
 
7.2 Alternative Dependant Variable 
Furthermore, using an alternative dependant variable allows us to test for robustness of results. We 
considered a slightly different depiction of income, known as income2 with summary statistics in 
Table 11. This dependant variable removes the cost factor of animal production which was 
conducted due to issues in the questionnaire structure. Running our various matching algorithms on 
this dependant variable demonstrates a little change in significance of our ATT.20 Under this 
dependant variable, our income ATT remains insignificantly different from zero with p- values of 
0.52 and 0.75 for MD and Genetic matching respectively (refer to Appendix A.4 for details). Thus, 
there is additional evidence that our income is insignificantly affected by treatment.  
20 We expected a reduction in significance which can be explained as by the following. As we remove this cost component, 
total income increases. Therefore, BF Income as a percent of total income will fall ceteris paribus. Thus, gains from 
treatment will appear smaller reducing significance of our ATT. 
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 7.3 Outliers in the Asset Growth Dependant Variable 
Although it is not advisable to drop outliers’ ex-post, for robustness purposes this practice was 
tested for our asset growth dependant variable in order to determine if the significant ATT under 
Genetic matching was driven solely by outliers. Positive, unmatched outliers in the dependant 
variable for the treatment group may indicate that our ATT is overestimated. This hypothesis was 
developed due to the strong significance of our lagged asset covariate in pre and post matching OLS. 
Furthermore, visually, there appears to be a group of outliers on the right of our asset growth 
distribution (refer to Figure 13). Upon further inspection, the largest change in assets can be 
attributed to poor HH recollection of lagged assets, where the 15 observations that reported zero 
asset value in 2007, had some of the largest asset value growth.  
Two tests were conducted by dropping different numbers of observations. Firstly, the single largest 
treatment observation was dropped. As expected, dropping this outlier (which reduces our 
treatment sample size) reduces the significance of our treatment on our asset growth dependant 
variable to the 15% significance level for MD, while with Genetic matching it remains significant at 
the 1% level (refer to Appendix A.5 for full results). A second test was conducted, dropping four 
treatment outliers, which lie to the right of 5 log unit difference in asset value (refer to Appendix A.6 
for results). As expected significance of our ATT decreases. Under MD our ATT becomes insignificant 
with p-value of 0.33. Genetic matching still performs well, providing a highly significant treatment p- 
value of 0.01. Under Genetic matching the ATT estimate remains constant at a 65% increase in asset 
growth. Thus, it appears that although outliers in the treatment variable affect our results, ATT 
significance remains when controlling for poor recollection under Genetic matching. This provides 
some evidence that our significant ATT is not entirely driven by outliers. 
 
Figure 12: Post Matching Distribution of Assets 
        MD             Gen 
      
Source: own depiction conducted in Stata  
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 Discussion of Results 
8.1 Findings Within the Conceptual Model 
The ATT of the ICDP treatment on human welfare was calculated using matching techniques, where 
we are most interested in results from MD and Genetic matching as they perform best in terms of 
balance.  Our results indicate an insignificant ATT on per capita income. In terms asset growth, MD 
finds no significant treatment effect, while Genetic matching finds a large and significant effect of 
65%. Furthermore, upon running OLS with the matched sample, treatment significance disappears 
which demonstrates instability of results. Although significant ATT on asset growth appears to be 
robust in terms of unobservable variable bias for Genetic matching, post matching covariate 
imbalance provides evidence that the significance of our results are overstated. In relation to the 
literature, Weber et al. find that assets are significantly affected by ICDP treatment, although Bauch 
et al. (2014) find the contrary. Furthermore, Weber et al. (2011) find treatment causes a significant 
change in cash income and Bauch et al. (2014) find a positive effect on HH income.  
Narrative 
Taking the results of Genetic matching seriously, a narrative of significant asset growth and 
insignificant income attributed to treatment was developed relating back to our theoretical 
framework. Although we are unable to control for which path treatment affects outcome, there 
exists a plausible narrative of our witnessed results in relation to the ‘changes in demand’ factor. 
This narrative relates to how the dependant variables are defined. Since income is calculated net 
production costs (including investment in productive assets), HH revenue gained from the ICDP may 
be reinvested into the production process. This would produce no change in income, but positively 
affect asset accumulation. Reinvested ICDP gains in productive durable goods appears to be a 
plausible start-up strategy, as new income generating activities may require investment in tools, 
machinery etc., especially in the short run. This narrative can be criticised on two fronts. Firstly, that 
our results are driven by outliers in the treatment group, making the ATT overestimated and biased. 
Secondly that low HH education and risk aversion would inhibit this action, especially over the short 
run. The next part of this sub section will describe potential causes and issue of outliers in our asset 
growth variable.  
Outliers in Assets 
If asset growth is driven by outliers in the treatment group, then the ATT may not a valid indicator of 
treatment effect. Furthermore, if large asset accumulation were driven by ‘non- productive 
investments’ (which would not be counted as a cost for income generation), then our narrative does 
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 not hold. There is some evidence to support this idea as outliers in terms of asset growth 
corresponded to HH which purchased highly valuable assets such as accommodation.  
In terms of outliers in asset growth, the treatment group appears to have greater quantity and larger 
outliers than the control groups. This indicates that our ATT is overstated. There are two drivers of 
outliers of asset growth. Firstly, they can be attributed to poor data quality. This can be 
demonstrated by the finding that all HH that reported an asset growth rate of greater than 5 log 
units also reported zero asset value in 2007. Secondly, large changes in asset accumulation could be 
driven by debt (negative asset) or savings (positive asset). The former does not appear to be a strong 
issue as the outliers HH in asset accumulation are not the same as those that have the largest net 
debt at the time of survey. On the other hands, savings could be considered as a driver for asset 
accumulation. This is plausible given the large proportion of HH income which falls in the ‘Other’ 
category including lump sum gains in the form of rent, social insurance benefits, inheritance, 
subsidies etc. It is difficult to analyse savings in the same manner as debt, as knowing if a HH had 
savings which they spent on asset accumulation, or never had savings to begin with is problematic 
with only current period savings data. This brief discussion demonstrates that there appears to be 
outliers which are unrelated to productive asset accumulation which provides evidence against our 
plausible narrative. Moreover, outliers created by poor recollection and savings may cause 
overestimation of results and bias in our ATT. 
In an attempt to control for these outliers, several (both 1 and 4) were dropped. Results show the 
significance of the ATT for MD increases to 0.33, while using Genetic matching asset growth remains 
highly significant with a p-value of 0.01 and a consistent asset growth rate of 65%. This indicates that 
outliers are not the only cause of our significant ATT and rather there are in fact distributional 
differences between the two groups which could be attributed to treatment. The remainder of this 
sub chapter will discuss bias caused by observable and unobservable variables which biases our 
results.  
Observable Characteristics 
The next step in understanding the distributional differences in asset growth between the two 
groups was to consider remaining imbalance across observable covariates. Almost unanimously, our 
robustness results point toward an overestimation of our treatment effect, which reduces 
significance of our ATT. However from these observable characteristics, there is one key variable 
that warrants further discussion as it may be an important driver of differences in HH asset 
accumulation between the two groups. Specifically, this refers imbalance in the variable ‘years 
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 participating in BFF’, which captures HH endowment. One may recall that this variable refers to the 
number of years a HH has received a monthly cash transfer through BFF. It is very likely that since 
the treatment group participated in BFF for longer duration, asset accumulation would be greater as 
HH would have had a longer period of relatively higher income to purchase durables. This narrative 
provides evidence that our significant results for the asset growth variable are biased. Difference in 
asset growth could be not only attributed to treatment, but rather a result of this important 
confounding factor. 
Unobservable Characteristics 
With this key difference in observable variables in mind, findings that asset growth is fairly robust to 
unobservable variables that may cause changes in treatment and outcome under Genetic matching 
are not surprising. For Genetic matching, the Wilcoxen test shows that unobservable characteristics 
would require a 60% change in likelihood to participate to change our inference. The Hodges-
Lehmann was even more robust requiring a 121% increase in participation to change inference. 
There are two candidates for these unobservable factors including lagged savings and 
entrepreneurial abilities. In terms of the former past savings could be a strong indicator of treatment 
and asset accumulation. In terms of the latter, ability would affect the motivation to participate and 
thus altering expected and realized gains from ICDP participation.  
Overall, there are many causes of concern, which reduce confidence in the significance of our results 
under Genetic matching. Therefore extreme caution when interpreting the strong significance found 
in the ATT should be given. All other parametric and non- parametric techniques for our ATT with 
our asset growth dependant variable provided insignificant results at standard levels. Furthermore, 
outliers, unobservable characteristics and remaining imbalance in key observable covariates 
demonstrate an overestimation of our ATT. Moreover, our income dependant variable is subject to 
the same array of issues in terms of observable variable imbalance and unobservable variable bias 
pointing to overestimation of our ATT significance. However, it should be noted the narrative of 
years participating in BFF does not hold the same weight with income as it did for asset growth. 
Overall, in combination these tests points toward a relatively robust finding that per capita income is 
insignificantly affected by the ICDP program at this point in time.  
8.2 Potential Reasons for Insignificant Effect 
Although, the BF Income seeks to promote access income generating opportunities and positive 
financial returns for HH, no significant effect of the program is expected for several reasons. The 
most general argument is that at the time of survey, only a relatively short period (maximum of 4 
years) had elapsed since the ICDP inception. Since ICDP are complicated, and require changing 
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 livelihood patterns, a short time horizon may be insufficient to witness an effect. This point can be 
given further detail. Firstly, at the time of survey we are unsure as to how far into actual ICDP 
implementation the process had evolved within each community. Moreover, there is heterogeneity 
in this process between treated communities, as each received independent in funding allocation 
and had autonomous decision making of how to best implement the ICDP.  
This time frame issue is heightened by HH risk aversion which acts as a strong barrier to 
implementation of new practices. Risk aversion and low participation can be thought of as a function 
of the HH preferences, education, and wealth. Other roadblocks may include financial, legal, political 
and institutional restrictions. Thus, even after HH gain access to a new income generating activity, 
there are many barriers to actual implementation. These can be mitigated through training, 
education and time to experiment with new practices in light of their own constraints.  
8.3 Limitations  
General Limitations  
There are a few common limitations which arise when conducting with- without experiments. These 
limitations may influence our results, and thus will be discussed briefly. Firstly, spill- over can be 
considered as the occurrence where treated HH affect non-treated ones and treatment effect is not 
isolated to the treatment community (Khandker et al., 2010). This could be an issue if there were 
trade between reserves. If this were a problem it would make the difference between the two 
groups smaller, reducing our treatment effect (Bauch et al., 2014). By assumption, this is not an 
issue as due to difficulties to travel between the two reserves. Another issue would involve HH 
migration to communities in order to gain from treatment. This would blur the delineation between 
treatment and control, and allow for self-selection into treatment. Once again, by assumption this 
not an issue as there is a two year prohibition on BFP participation, which is a strong incentive to 
prevent migration for solely program gains. However, indirect gains from other members of the 
community receiving the program could be achieved.  
 
Treatment Variable  
There are several limitations to this study with regard to the treatment variable. Firstly, an issue with 
treatment definition is that treatment was not homogenous in terms of value, type and time of 
implementation. One could speculate that higher value investment, and longer periods of 
implementation would lead to greater HH participation, and greater profitability. Furthermore, 
different ICDP investments may have different growth rates in participation and profitability.  
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 Moreover, a heterogeneous treatment effect could arise even when holding treatment type 
constant. This could be attributed to HH investing different amounts of resources in the ICDP due to 
differences in opportunity costs. Furthermore, as Gebara illustrates, certain HH may benefit directly 
from the ICDP implementation, while others only gain indirectly from greater attention from 
monitoring and evaluation officers and  tourism (Gebara, 2013; Bauch et al., 2014). Moreover, 
perhaps greater monitoring may constrain illegal income generating activities which would 
otherwise have gone unnoticed. Furthermore, due to the communal decision making structure in 
the ICDP development, powerful members of the community may have greater influence in deciding 
which specific ICDP was implemented. Thus, community investment may directly benefit a select 
few community members which may have vested interests due to own preferences, experience, 
resources, connections etc.  
 
It could be argued that defining treatment on the community level does not accurately reflect actual 
HH participation in BF Income. This issue was taken into account by Bauch et al. (2014) who 
considered treatment on both the community level and he HH level across different points in time. 
One alternative treatment variable could be percent of HH participating in the treated community 
which would reflect intensity of participation. A community level definition has the benefit of 
capturing all indirect costs and benefits through spill overs between community members (Bauch et 
al., 2014). These can include changes in demand for certain goods due to changes in production 
practices, as well as indirect benefits and costs.  Although a HH level definition of treatment may 
provide results of direct gain from treatment, a lack of correct designation from responses creates 
obscurity and biases our ATT results. This can be illustrated by an example where a community’s 
ICDP promotes Brazil Nuts, and the HH reported partaking in this activity. If a HH attributes Brazil nut 
gain to their ‘Agricultural activity’ rather than ‘Collective Income’, a HH level of treatment may prove 
unreliable. A community level definition helps to mitigate this issue, as treatment status is 
independent of participation. Overall, although there are certain benefits for using a community 
level definition of treatment, using multiple definitions of treatment is recommended. In our case, 
the reason only a community level definition was chosen was due data constraints.  
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 Conclusions and Recommendations  
There are various approaches used to tackle environmental and human wellbeing in protected areas 
although there is no clear best approach. One strategy is an indirect ICDP approach which seeks to 
use the synergies between rural livelihoods in valuable natural environments to develop ‘win-win’ 
outcomes of environmental sustainability and gains in HH welfare. 
The impact evaluation literature on management strategies largely focuses on environmental goals. 
Conversely, this thesis measures effectiveness in terms of the often secondary goals of human 
wellbeing. This thesis contributes to the small body of literature which uses rigorous program 
evaluation techniques to measure the additionality of ICDP implemented in protected areas with a 
focus on human wellbeing. Real world quantitative evaluation is necessary as it has strong ties to 
program and policy development, funding allocation and mitigating environmental damage and rural 
poverty. However, the contextual nature of case study based program evaluation results in low 
external validity and extrapolation of results into broader conclusions (Börner et al., 2013).    
The additionality of the ICDP treatment was evaluated using a case study of two reserves from the 
BFP.  It was measured as the ATT relative to the counterfactual control reserve over the short run. 
The dependant variables used to measure human wellbeing included log income and log difference 
in assets or asset growth. 
The primary issue that this paper seeks to address was that of selection bias, whereby characteristics 
simultaneously determine both participation and outcome. This is an important issue which plagues 
program evaluation. Given available non- randomized data, regression analysis and matching 
approaches were conducted in order to determine the ATT. Both approaches control for relevant 
observable factors which can be categorized as affecting productivity, social capital, endowment, 
economies of scale within HH and community factors.  These factors control for selection bias under 
the assumption that these are the only relevant characteristics in determining both program 
selection and outcome.   
Our balancing criteria in non- parametric matching demonstrate MD and Genetic matching perform 
best. In this regard, both selected matching algorithms and post matching OLS demonstrate no 
significant effect of ICDP treatment on the income dependant variable. On the other hand, MD and 
post matching OLS find no significance of treatment on our asset growth variable. However, Genetic 
matching found a highly significant ATT of 65% which was fairly robust to unobservable variables.  
Taking the results of Genetic matching seriously, there is a plausible narrative for realizing this dual 
result which consists of HH reinvesting program gains in productive assets. Although this may seem 
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 like an intuitive and viable strategy for a start-up organization which seeks to grow and improve 
efficiency, perhaps it is overstating local sophistication especially when considering low levels of 
education and risk aversion. Other potential drivers of the significant ATT were inspected including 
outlier driven results, which could be attributed to poor HH recollection or omitted variables in the 
form of savings and debt. Removing outliers did not alter the significant effect on asset growth 
under Genetic matching. This indicates overall distributional differences between the treated and 
control communities in terms of asset growth.   
Furthermore, issues of imbalance across key observable characteristics such as ‘time participating in 
BFF’ remain, which could be a strong driver of these differences in asset growth. Specifically, longer 
duration with additional income supported by BFF would allow HH greater opportunities to 
accumulate assets. This finding, in addition to imbalance amongst other observable covariates 
provides evidence that our significant asset growth result was overstated. Overall, insignificant 
results on the growth in assets dependant variable under MD and post matching OLS, in addition to 
potential unobservable variable bias due to covariates such as savings and entrepreneurial skill, and 
remaining imbalance in key observable characteristics indicate that one should be cautious when 
interpreting significance of our results.   
In general, the ICDP strategy has been criticised for low effectiveness and inconclusive results. 
Although our results are no different, one should recall the context the BFP is applied. The BFP 
targets reserves which already have relatively low environmental pressure and levels of poverty. If 
the greatest immediate change to these goals were the sole criteria for program development, 
perhaps the BFP is misplaced. Rather, the BFP holds a long term approach which seeks to mitigate 
future environmental threats by developing local conservation allies. This long duration fits well with 
the ICDP strategy.  
Over the short run expecting significant results is optimistic as even under strong incentives 
livelihoods take time to adjust. Firstly, relatively intangible gains in the form of participant 
empowerment and social capital formation (with positive externalities) may not affect measurable 
HH wellbeing over the short run. Furthermore, if the ICDP had not been successfully or fully 
implemented in the community at the time of survey, indicators of success may even decrease as HH 
may allocate scarce resources (physical, time, financial etc.) toward participation. As the project 
matures, and efficiency in production and marketing improve, one would expect project profitability 
to increase. Moreover, over a longer time span, HH risk aversion and preferences may change, 
resulting in greater direct gains from program participation. 
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 Although the ICDP appears to have had an insignificant effect, this does not necessarily indicate its 
overall ineffectiveness. Rather, the process requires more time to bear fruit. Further evaluation at a 
later date where the program has had full potential to implemented and adopted by HH would be 
recommended. This is especially important as finding no significant effect over any time horizon 
implies program funds simply act as a subsidy for those living in the reserve. After all, the goal of the 
ICDP is to develop local capacity and build both environmentally sustainable and profitable income 
generating sources which are viable without indefinite external support.  
Further Research 
There are several recommendations for further research which would be possible with a richer 
dataset. Firstly, our community level definition of treatment is quite broad; although it has the 
benefit of accounting for spill- overs within treated communities. Another definition based on direct 
HH participation may prove to be interesting. Moreover, it would be interesting to study a 
heterogeneous treatment effect. This is plausible due to power dynamics within a community, which 
shape ICDP rollout favouring powerful community members. Furthermore, treatment designation in 
our study was considered based on receiving the community ICDP program irrespective of program 
type and amount allocated. Controlling for these factors would provide a better understanding of 
marginal returns to support. Lastly, post matching imbalance in key observable characteristics 
remained an issue in this study. Conducting exact matching on these covariates would reduce this 
source of bias.  
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 Appendix 
A.1 
Quasi- experimental approaches commonly use two data designs; before and after the program/ 
treatment and with/ without. A combination of the two designs is also possible. A before and after 
design assumes a constant trend over time, whereby no external factors that affects outcome arises. 
On the other hand, a with- without design assumes that expected outcomes from the treatment and 
control groups in absence of implementation are the same.  
 The quasi- experimental approaches explained in Table 19 have certain assumptions which if are not 
met produce biased results. Providing motivation how these assumptions are met is necessary 
(Miteva et al., 2012). It should be noted, several of these techniques can be used in conjunction.  
Table 19: Description of Quasi- Experimental Approaches 
 Difference in 
Differences(DID) Instrumental Variable (IV) 
Regression Discontinuity 
Design (RDD) 
Description 
DID removes unobservable 
differences by assuming they 
are time invariant. This 
assumption can be a problem if 
changes are a function of 
initiation conditions that 
influence participation (Bauch et 
al., 2014). A much less robust 
approach is the single difference 
which uses the with- without 
design. This can be referred to 
as naive analysis, as it assumes 
no selection bias.  
 
IV seeks to break the correlation 
between the error term and 
treatment. It uses a variable 
correlated with treatment, but 
which does not affect outcome 
directly. Thus, the only path the 
IV affects outcome is through 
treatment.  The causal effect is 
estimated “by measuring how the 
outcome varies with the portion 
of the total variation in the 
treatment explained by variation 
in the instrumental variable” 
(Miteva et al., 2012, p 73). One 
issue regarding this method is 
finding a strong and valid IV; one 
that is correlated with treatment 
and exogenous to outcome.  
 
RDD follows a different 
approach to the other quasi 
experimental designs. 
Instead of making 
assumptions to develop a 
counterfactual, it rather 
assumes randomization over 
a small region. RDD requires 
a characteristic with a cut-off 
point that determines 
treatment status. Over a 
small region, one can assume 
no difference in covariates X, 
thus the only difference in 
outcome can be attributed to 
treatment (Khandker et al., 
2010). 
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 A.2 
Table 20: Variable Description 
Variable Type Units Survey Description 
Total pc income Continuous  R$ HH Total HH per capita income  
Diff asset value Continuous  R$ HH Difference in asset value between 2013 and 
2007 
treatment Dummy 1= Treated Community Participating in BF Income 
HHH sex Dummy 0= male HH Sex of HHH 
HHH age Continuous years HH Age of HHH 
HHH edu Continuous  Years HH Education of HHH 
Max edu Continuous Years HH Maximum education of HH members 
Dependancy ratio Continuous Children/ HH 
member 
HH Dependency Ratio 
Adult sick Continuous Days  HH Number of days working aged members 
(>18) were sick 
interior Dummy 1= interior HH Born in Interior 
Eth. majority Dummy 1 = majority HH HHH or spouse belonging to ethnic majority 
Rel. majority Dummy 1= majority HH HHH belonging to religious majority 
Community year Continuous Years Community  Years since BFF implemented 
Env. shock Dummy  1= Shocked Community At least 2 environmental shocks occurred in 
the last year 
Health timea Continuous Hours Community Time to health facility 
Edu timea Continuous Hours Community Time to education  facility 
Distance centre Continuous Km HH Distance from house to centre of 
community 
Distance Mktc Continuous Hours HH and 
Community 
Total distance to market 
Asset 07 Continuous R$ HH Total value of lagged assets 
electricity Dummy 1= Yes HH Access to electricity either by wired 
connection, or through owning a generator 
or solar power 
BFF Dummy 1= Yes HH HH participating in BFF 
BFF year Continuous  Years HH Years since family had participated in BFF 
land Continuous Ha HH Amount of land owned 
a Time was considered zero if the facility was located within the community  
c Market distance was calculated as the sum of distance from the HH to the community centre and the distance from the 
community centre to large market 
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 A.3 
Table 21: Covariate Balance before and after Treatment 
Covariate   Mean 
   
p-value 
(mean) 
 
pooled 
Difference 
 
Var Ratio 
 
eQQ   
  
Treated 
un 
matched 
Ctrl un 
matched Ctrl MD 
Ctrl 
Gen 
un 
matched MD Gen 
un 
matched MD Gen 
un 
matched MD Gen 
un 
matched MD Gen 
HHH sex 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.09 0.58 1.00 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.13 0.87 1.00 1.42 0.02 0.00 0.05 
HHH age 46.61 47.34 44.21 43.01 0.74 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.16 0.23 0.85 0.92 1.15 1.91 2.89 3.64 
HHH edu 5.06 3.97 4.49 4.90 0.04 0.11 0.56 0.42 0.14 0.04 1.30 1.81 2.02 1.14 0.82 0.92 
max edu 8.36 6.93 7.38 7.36 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.55 0.26 0.27 1.09 1.76 1.87 1.48 1.07 1.18 
dep ratio 0.33 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.19 0.03 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.96 1.15 1.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 
days sick 11.58 13.43 4.90 12.44 0.60 0.00 0.64 0.10 0.30 0.04 0.55 3.32 1.26 3.47 6.67 3.06 
interior 0.79 0.77 0.83 0.84 0.71 0.18 0.21 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.94 1.15 1.22 0.02 0.03 0.05 
eth maj 0.90 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.31 0.02 0.04 0.21 0.19 0.15 1.58 2.11 1.71 0.03 0.06 0.05 
rel maj 0.79 0.74 0.83 0.79 0.37 0.32 1.00 0.18 0.08 0.00 0.86 1.15 1.00 0.06 0.03 0.00 
Community 
year 30.06 24.23 28.54 23.48 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.67 0.10 0.42 3.19 6.97 2.76 5.97 6.39 6.71 
Env shock 0.28 0.09 0.25 0.17 0.00 0.48 0.05 0.72 0.05 0.23 2.53 1.06 1.40 0.20 0.02 0.10 
health time 0.27 0.46 0.02 0.58 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.29 1.00 1.26 0.04 65.86 0.03 0.50 0.25 0.60 
edu time 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.92 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.15 0.17 2.09 3.43 3.76 0.07 0.05 0.06 
Distance 
centre 0.87 1.25 0.99 0.87 0.20 0.51 0.98 0.25 0.06 0.00 0.71 1.35 1.05 0.48 0.44 0.25 
Mkt distance 43.50 59.09 54.65 48.56 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.85 0.46 0.21 0.97 1.05 1.62 15.28 11.81 10.55 
Asset 07 8.72 8.33 8.75 8.80 0.30 0.91 0.64 0.20 0.01 0.03 0.78 1.48 1.37 0.58 0.60 0.66 
electricity 1.13 0.93 1.05 1.03 0.02 0.22 0.26 0.45 0.15 0.17 0.69 0.99 0.69 0.20 0.08 0.12 
BFF 27.53 22.80 27.90 25.63 0.59 0.91 0.83 0.11 0.01 0.03 1.79 0.84 3.06 8.16 6.95 10.53 
BFF year 0.75 0.48 0.67 0.69 0.00 0.07 0.16 0.77 0.18 0.13 0.76 0.85 0.88 0.28 0.08 0.06 
land 2.80 1.14 1.72 1.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.34 0.58 0.60 2.01 1.89 1.98 1.68 1.08 1.12 
Source: Own Calculation conducted in R 
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 A.4 
Table 22: Treatment effect with Income2 Dependant Variable 
 
PS probit Probit (caliper) MD Gen Match 
Estimate -0.09 -0.08 -0.10 -0.05 
SEa 0.25 0.19 0.16 0.14 
T-stat -0.35 -0.40 -0.64 -0.32 
p-value 0.72 0.69 0.52 0.75 
Source: Own Calculation conducted in R 
a Abadie and Imbens standard error 
 
A.5  
Table 23: Treatment effect after dropping 1 asset outlier 
 
Probit Probit (caliper) MD Gen Match 
Estimate 0.11 0.00 0.40 0.79 
SE 0.69 0.51 0.27 0.26 
T-stat 0.16 0.01 1.49 3.06 
p-value 0.87 0.99 0.14 0.00 
Source: Own Calculation conducted in R 
a Abadie and Imbens standard error 
 
A.6  
Table 24: Treatment effect after dropping 4 asset outliers 
 
Probit Probit (caliper) MD Gen Match 
Estimate 0.30 0.30 0.24 0.50 
SE 0.34 0.24 0.24 0.19 
T-stat 0.87 1.22 0.98 2.73 
p-value 0.38 0.22 0.33 0.01 
Source: Own Calculation conducted in R 
a Abadie and Imbens standard error 
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